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I. INTRODUCTION
 Pre-dispute mandatory arbitration provisions are a favorite whipping post for 
consumer advocates. recent academic literature is filled with articles condemning 
the process. opponents see mandatory arbitration clauses as unconscionable and 
designed principally to deny the consumer a day in court. almost daily, calls are 
made for legislation and/or regulations banning mandatory pre-dispute arbitration 
provisions. at the time of this writing, bills are pending in the united States House 
of representatives and the Senate that would effectively void any pre-dispute 
mandatory arbitration provision in contracts involving consumer transactions, 
franchise agreements, employment agreements, and any dispute arising under any 
statute intended to protect civil rights.1 (I will refer these agreements as the “targeted 
group.”)
 of course, not everyone agrees that mandatory arbitration is unfair and/or 
unconscionable. Its proponents point to a long list of practical reasons they claim 
should be considered in favor of arbitration.2 In this article, I argue that because 
mandatory arbitration clauses serve to overcome destabilizing and toxic effects of 
asymmetrical information, this function should be added to the proponent’s list of 
practical reasons favoring mandatory arbitration.
 asymmetrically held information is about “situations where one economic agent 
knows something that another economic agent doesn’t.”3 In the rough and tumble of 
the marketplace, parties doing business require information about one another in 
order to build a foundation of trust. The more f luid the exchange and the more 
perfect the information, the more likely there will be a high level of trust. 
asymmetrically held information, by definition, undermines achieving trust. It’s a 
powerful negative force—one that can tilt the playing field in favor of the party in 
possession of the information and away from party who is in the dark. why? Because 
asymmetric information:
•	 	Can,	 without	 warning,	 dramatically	magnify	 the	 scope	 of	 an	
assumed risk, rendering that risk uninsurable;4
1. H.r. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009). This bill is similar to two bills that were before the 110th Congress but 
that never made it to a vote in either the House or the Senate. See Recent Proposed Legislation: Arbitration 
- Congress Considers Bill to Invalidate Pre-Dispute Arbitration Clauses for Consumers, Employees and 
Franchisees. - Arbitration Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007), 121 Harv. l. rev. 2262 (2008). also 
pending in the Senate is S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009). In substance, this bill seeks to achieve the same 
goals as H.r. 1020 except that S. 931 creates a new chapter within the Federal arbitration act dealing 
exclusively with the enforceability of predispute arbitration provisions in employment, consumer, 
franchise, and civil rights disputes. Id.
2. See list infra text accompanying note 13 and Part IV.a.
3. Hal r. Varian, Microeconomics analysis, 440 (3d ed. 1992).
4. For purposes of this article, uninsurable risks include risks for which there is simply no insurance 
product available, as well as risks for which there is insurance but it is nominal compared to the entire 
risk. For instance, liability insurance exists that covers employment discrimination claims. However, 
these policies are quite expensive and include very large deductibles and very low coverage limits.
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•	 	Can	create	new	risks	that	are	so	ethereal	as	to	be	uninsurable	by	
third parties; and
•	 	Can	stimulate	the	need	to	develop	new	techniques	and	tools	 to	
overcome uncertainty.
 as we shall see, with each type of agreement in the targeted group, the effects of 
asymmetrically held information yield a unique type of risk. For example, for 
consumer credit, it is credit risk; for franchising, it is reputation risk; and for 
employment, it is morale and business interruption risk. These risks are real, come 
about because of an imbalance, undermine commerce, and for the most part cannot 
be mitigated with the purchase of insurance.
 In this article, I posit that if asymmetrically held information creates an 
uncertainty that can’t be insured against, mandatory arbitration is a reasonable 
measure for the restoration of the equilibrium; it affords a f lexible, efficient, timely, 
and cost effective method for dispute resolution and assists businesses competing in 
uncertain markets.5 Because of these benefits, mandatory arbitration compensates in 
the sense that it transfers some of the risk created by asymmetrically held information 
back to the party creating that risk. This in turn: (1) levels the playing field, and (2) 
acts at the very least as a partial substitute for insurance purchased from a third 
party. This “transfer effect” occurs with all the agreements in the targeted group. 
Public policy should not be fashioned to deny this valuable benefit to anyone wishing 
to give it serious consideration. and this is true even when mandatory arbitration is 
operative because of an adhesion agreement.6
 I also propose that before legislation is enacted to regulate the use of pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses, the following four (4) conditions need to be established with 
empirical evidence:
1.  Mandatory arbitration serves no practical purpose other than 
unfairly benefiting the party insisting on such a clause;
5. arbitration as a tool for the management of risk is a relatively new concept. See generally Scott Baker, A 
Risk Based Approach to Mandatory Arbitration, 83 or. l. rev. 861, 862–63 (2004).
6. adhesion agreements with pre-dispute arbitration clauses are not per se unconscionable. Deluca v. 
Bear Stearns & Co., 175 F. Supp. 2d. 102, 115 (D. Mass. 2001); Bolter v. Superior Court of orange 
County, 104 Cal. rptr. 2d 888, 894 (Cal. Ct. app. 2001); walther v. Sovereign Bank, 872 a.2d 735, 
746 (Md. 2005). See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson lane Corp., 500 u.S. 20, 33 (1991); rosenberg v. 
Merrill lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 170 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1999); Gold v. Deutsche 
aktiengesellschaft, 365 F.3d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 2004); Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 
1281 (9th Cir. 2006); Chase Commercial Corp. v. owen, 588 N.E.2d 705, 708-09 (Mass. app. Ct. 
1992). The adhesion agreement argument against mandatory arbitration presupposes that consumers, 
franchisees and employees are unsophisticated and vulnerable to opportunistic behavior on behalf of 
large corporations. See opening Statement of u.S. Senator russ Feingold, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee 
on the Constitution: Hearing on “The arbitration Fairness act of 2007,” 110th Cong. (2007), available 
at http://Feingold.senate.gov/statements/07/12/20071212.htm; william l. Killion, The Modern Myth 
of the Vulnerable Franchisee: The Case for a More Balanced View of the Franchisor-Franchisee Relationship, 28 
Franchise l. J. 23 (2008).
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2.  The practical purposes served by mandatory arbitration are 
without economic justification;
3.  The practical purposes are at the least substantively 
unconscionable; and
4.  There is resulting direct harm to the party against whom 
mandatory arbitration is imposed.
 In Part II of this article, I explore details about the role that asymmetrically held 
information plays in the decision to rely on arbitration as the preferred method for 
dispute resolution. The discussion in Part II is framed in the context of three types 
of contracts that are the subject of ongoing congressional efforts to ban pre-dispute 
mandatory arbitration: consumer agreements (limited in this article to credit cards7), 
franchise agreements, and arrangements for employment.8 
 In Part III, I will first review the arguments, pro and con, concerning the fairness 
of arbitration and match these positions with the recent f lood of empirical studies 
evaluating the efficacy and fairness of the arbitration process. In Part IV, I examine 
issues surrounding the public policy debate and the wisdom of any solution that bans 
the enforcement of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses.
 I conclude that asymmetrically held information can have a pernicious impact in 
the commercial arena, one that is appropriately offset in large measure by mandatory 
arbitration. The empirical evidence examining the issue of fairness is trending toward 
a presupposition of fairness, and there is no need at this time to reform arbitration as 
we know it to either regulate or ban the use of mandatory arbitration clauses.
7. The concerns about arbitration differ substantially when larger loans are involved. See Keith N. Hylton, 
Agreements to Waive or Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis, 8 S. Ct. Econ. rev. 209, 231–32 
(2000). This dichotomy is not unique to banking. It is found in franchising as well.
 [P]arties may avoid arbitration of what might be called “bet-the-company” cases – high 
stakes cases in which an erroneous outcome could jeopardize the continued existence of 
the company. at least some parties may perceive arbitration as too risky for such cases 
because of the limited court review of arbitration awards. In more routine cases, 
“knucklehead awards” or “‘roll-the-dice’ or ‘russian roulette’ arbitration” awards would 
be just another cost of the dispute resolution process. But in high stakes cases, an 
aberrational award could have a devastating effect on the company, and may lead parties 
to avoid arbitration altogether for contracts that may give rise to such disputes.
 Christopher r. Drahozal & Quentin r. wittrock, Is There a Flight From Arbitration?, 37 Hofstra l. 
rev. 71, 80 (2008).
8. These are the three specified types of agreements that are targeted by the arbitration Fairness act of 
2007. arbitration Fairness act of 2007, S. 1782, 100th Cong. § 2 (2007); see supra note 1. The 
arbitration Fairness act of 2007 made unenforceable contracts or transactions between parties of 
“unequal bargaining power.” Id. § 4. This language was so vague that it was dropped from the revised 
version submitted in 2009. See arbitration Fairness act of 2009 S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009).
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II.  EFFECT OF ASYMMETRICALLY HELD INFORMATION: MANDATORY 
ARBITRATION AND THE NEED FOR SELF-HELP MEASURES
 This section examines the potentially harmful effects associated with 
asymmetrically held information. The discussion is framed by the terms of a bill 
pending in Congress: the arbitration Fairness act of 2009, which would render 
unenforceable pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses in the targeted group.9 
There is a debate that runs parallel; it is about whether it is appropriate to employ 
mandatory arbitration to resolve statutory claims. That debate is beyond the scope of 
this article.10 The purpose of Part II is to establish the need for the public policy 
9. The arbitration Fairness act of 2009 provides in part:
 No predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration 
of—
(1) an employment, consumer, or franchise dispute; or
(2) a dispute arising under any statute intended to protect civil rights.
 an issue as to whether this . . . applies to an arbitration agreement shall be determined 
by Federal law. Except as otherwise provided . . . , the validity or enforceability of an 
agreement to arbitrate shall be determined by the court, rather than the arbitrator, 
irrespective of whether the party resisting arbitration challenges the arbitration 
agreement specifically or in conjunction with other terms of the contract containing 
such agreement. . . . Nothing in this chapter shall apply to any arbitration provision in 
a collective bargaining agreement.
 H.r. 1020, 111th Cong. § 2(b) (2009). The version of the bill introduced in the Senate defines in detail 
what is meant by employment, consumer, franchise, and civil rights dispute. See S.931, 111th Cong. § 
401 (2009). a civil rights dispute is:
 [a] dispute arising under the Constitution of the united States or the constitution of a 
State; or a Federal or State statute that prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex, 
disability, religion, national origin, or any invidious basis in education, employment, 
credit, housing, public accommodations and facilities, voting, or program funded or 
conducted by the Federal Government or State government, including any statute 
enforced by the Civil rights Division of the Department of Justice and any statute 
enumerated in section 62(e) of the Internal revenue Code of 1986 (relating to unlawful 
discrimination); and in which at least 1 party alleging a violation of the Constitution of 
the united States, a State constitution, or a statute prohibiting discrimination is an 
individual.
 Id. (formatting notations omitted). a consumer dispute is “a dispute between a person other than an 
organization who seeks or acquires real or personal property, services (including services relating to 
securities and other investments), money, or credit for personal, family, or household purposes and the 
seller or provider of such property, services, money, or credit.” Id. The term employment dispute “means a 
dispute between an employer and employee arising out of the relationship of employer and employee as 
defined in section 3 of the Fair labor Standards act of 1938 (29 u.S.C. 203).” Id. a franchise dispute is:
 [a] dispute between a franchisee with a principal place of business in the united States 
and a franchisor arising out of or relating to contract or agreement by which a franchisee 
is granted the right to engage in the business of offering, selling, or distributing goods 
or services under a marketing plan or system prescribed in substantial part by a 
franchisor.
 Id.
10. For a discussion of the issues involved in that debate, see Margaret l. Moses, Arbitration Law: Who’s in 
Charge?, (loyola univ. Chicago Sch. of law Pub. law & legal Theory research Paper Series No. 
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debate to take into account the practical necessities of arbitrations as a solution to 
realistic threats to players in the marketplace. These threats arise from a number of 
circumstances, including asymmetrically held information. It is my view that if 
Congress adopts any scheme to reform arbitration under the Federal arbitration act 
(“Faa”),11 Congress must consider these concerns.12
 Not everyone sees mandatory arbitration as being an attack on the consumer, 
employee, or franchisee. Professor ware notes that there are many practical and 
appropriate reasons why a business might prefer arbitration over the traditional 
litigation format:
•	 	Elimination	of	juries	and	the	potential	for	high	damage	awards;
•	 	Emphasis	 on	 confidentiality	 serves	 to	 shield	 participants	 from	
publicity;
•	 	Assurance	that	disputes	are	resolved	using	a	nationally	uniform	
set of procedures;
•	 	Savings	on	the	cost	of	appeals;
•	 	Elimination	of	class	action	litigation;
•	 	Deterrence	 of	 litigation	 by	 imposing	obligations	 to	 pay	 fees	 on	
claimants; and 
•	 	Reduction	of	discovery	costs.13
 In addition, two more “business” related reasons have been suggested: (1) it 
affords a hands-on opportunity to decide who will resolve a dispute, and (2) 
dispositive decisions are made using commercial norms.14 
 In this article, my task is to persuade the reader that when asymmetrically held 
information gives rise to risks that are uninsurable, mandatory arbitration is a “fair” 
measure of self-help.
2009-001, 2009), Seton Hall l. rev. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1287303. 
See also Jean r. Sternlight, A Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just?, 57 Sta. l. rev. 1631, 1643–75 
(2005).
11. 9 u.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2009).
12. also before Congress is H.r. 991, 111th Cong. § 1003(a) (2009). The scope of this bill is limited to 
consumer transactions. The bill would not only render a pre-dispute arbitration clause unenforceable in 
consumer transactions, but in addition, the inclusion of such a provision would be “treated as an unfair 
and deceptive trade act or practice under Federal or State law.” Id.
13. Stephen J. ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 
J. Disp. resol. 89, 90–91. See also Drahozal, supra note 7, at 71, 77–78.
14. linda Demaine and Deborah Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: 
The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 law & Contemp. Probs. 55 (2004).
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 A.  The Problem of Asymmetrically Held Information: Why it Belongs on the List of 
Valid Business Reasons Supporting the Need for Mandatory Arbitration
 Donald rumsfeld, referring to the Johari Window, famously observed: 
There are known knowns. There are things we know that we know. There 
are known unknowns. That is to say, there are things we that know we don’t 
know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we don’t 
know we don’t know.15
 asymmetrically held information is about knowing that we don’t know something 
and how to react accordingly.
 Information once disclosed is only perfect while it remains current and accurate 
and therefore useful for measuring a particular risk. when change happens, information 
may become imperfect, which is to say outdated and inaccurate. when information 
becomes imperfect, the risks that were assumed based on perfect information must be 
reevaluated. The injunctions of the commercial market environment require participants 
to assume that information will morph and become imperfect over time. Participants 
must then develop strategies to reallocate assumed risk. The key for survival is 
recognizing the need to implement appropriate strategies.
 For our purposes, in a commercial setting, asymmetrically held information can 
be thought of as:
•	 	Information	that	has	morphed	from	perfect	to	imperfect;
•	 	Thereby	having	the	potential	to	handicap	the	ability	of	any	party	
to reallocate and/or reapportion risk;
•	 	With	 this	 condition	 known	 to	 just	 one	 party	 to	 a	 commercial	
relationship. 
 So we can say that under certain circumstances, asymmetrically held information 
can operate to magnify an existing risk. In addition, the mere possibility that 
asymmetrically held information may exist creates uncertainty that renders the original 
risk, much less any subsequent transformation, uninsurable because insurers are not 
likely to insure something that can’t be evaluated and priced on an ongoing basis.
 of the three contracts making up the target group, consumer and franchise 
agreements involve risks arising from the conduct of a party who is either in default 
or has failed to perform in accordance with contractual standards. In other words, 
these risks are respondent, as opposed to claimant driven, and the asymmetrically held 
information concerns respondent behavior. Employment presents a somewhat different 
picture. In this arena, the employer, the proponent of mandatory arbitration, is most 
15. Donald rumsfeld, u.S. Sec’y of Defense, Defense Dept. Briefing (Feb. 12, 2002) (transcript available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636). See also Jospeh luft, A 
Graphic Model of Awareness in Interpersonal Relationships, NTl reading Book for Human relations 
Training, 1982, http://www.library.wisc.edu/EDVrC/docs/public/pdfs/SEEDreadings/
Johariwindow.pdf.
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likely the respondent based on claims said to arise from the employer’s behavior. 
while the asymmetrically held information (the employee’s attitude) is a by-product 
of the employer’s alleged behavior, the genesis for the risk is the inability of the 
employer to learn of and address employee dissatisfaction until it’s too late.
 In the context of employment, Professor Scott Baker equates functional 
characteristics of mandatory arbitration to insurance. He notes that there are three 
(3) attributes common to both insurance and mandatory arbitration:
1.  Transfer of a given risk.
2.  The probability of the risk actually materializing depends on the 
actions or latent characteristics of the party making the transfer.
3.  asymmetrically-held information about the potential for the 
actuality of the risk is controlled by the party making the transfer 
which in turn makes the cost expensive.16
 Baker concludes that an employer has two choices when considering the cost of a 
claim for discrimination. The employer can pay for an expensive insurance policy 
from a third party and lay off the cost of litigation and verdicts. or, the employer can 
insist on mandatory arbitration, a process likely to mean an abbreviated litigation 
process, smaller awards, and the possible elimination of class action claims.17 In other 
words, Baker argues that mandatory arbitration is actually operating as a direct 
16. Baker, supra note 5, at 874–75. as Baker describes:
 The [insurance] model is used to highlight problems of asymmetric[ally-held] 
information. These problems arise under three conditions: (1) one party agrees to bear 
a risk, (2) the probability that the risk will materialize depends on another party’s 
actions or latent characteristics, and (3) information asymmetries make it hard to contract 
on these actions or latent characteristics. with insurance, for example, the insured pays a 
premium and transfers the risk of the insured-against event to the insurer. The insured’s 
actions and latent characteristics influence the chance that the insured-against event will 
take place. and, finally, it is sometimes hard to write a contract whose payment is 
contingent on the insured’s actions and latent characteristics. . . .
 In the case of mandatory arbitration, a similar transaction takes place. Through 
mandatory arbitration, the employer transfers to the employee some of the risk of 
discriminatory conduct in the workplace. The employer’s actions and characteristics 
inf luence whether or not there is discrimination in the workplace. That is, the employer’s 
monitoring, training, and selecting its workforce impacts whether an employee suffers 
discrimination or perceives she has suffered discrimination.
 Id.
17. Id. at 879–80. Baker describes:
 These structural differences between arbitration and litigation clarify the risk-
management benefits of arbitration. arbitration reduces the employer’s payout if the 
employee suffers discrimination and files suit. By eliminating the chance of a large jury 
verdict or class-action lawsuit, mandatory arbitration insulates the employer from some 
of the risk that f lows from the filing of discrimination claims.
 Id. (internal references omitted).
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substitute for insurance.18 I argue that in the case of employment disputes, mandatory 
arbitration does more: If used in conjunction with other dispute resolution techniques 
such as mediation, it also serves to mitigate the risk created by asymmetrically held 
information.
 like financial institutions extending commercial credit, and franchisors, 
(collectively referred to as “providers”), employers almost never have perfect 
information about anyone with whom they do business. They almost always learn 
about adversities only after conditions have already impacted the risk profile of “the 
other guy.” with this often unwelcome new information, providers by necessity look 
for tools to restore the balance that existed when the original risk was accepted. High 
on the list of tools available is mandatory arbitration. For the financing institution 
and the franchisor, arbitration proactively serves to help contain the adverse effects of 
behavior likely to increase lender risk or reputational risk. In employment agreements, 
arbitration serves not only to transfer risk of, and reduce exposure to, excessive 
verdicts and other costs, it also serves to affirmatively support the workplace 
environment and assist in resolving disputes quietly; thereby minimizing business 
interruption and the decline of workplace morale.
 Given these advantages, it seems understandable that each of the providers would 
want assurances that the tool of arbitration is available at the outset of the 
relationship.19 waiting until after a dispute arises isn’t a realistic option because by 
then the disputant will most likely resist realizing that the provider is at a distinct 
disadvantage if consent is withheld.20
 let’s now apply these observations to some real world situations.
18. Id. at 896–97.
 Mandatory arbitration may function as a substitute for, or a complement to, liability 
insurance. Employers might choose to use mandatory arbitration as a substitute for 
three reasons. First, although widely available, liability insurance is expensive. Second, 
when a discrimination claim arises, the parties often contest whether the claim falls 
within the coverage limits of the liability insurance policy. Similar coverage disputes do 
not arise with mandatory arbitration, because the risk-management benefits of 
mandatory arbitration accrue no matter what kind of claim is asserted against the 
employer. Third, liability insurance policies usually cap the amount of payment on the 
policy and exclude coverage for punitive damages. There are no similar restrictions 
with mandatory arbitration.
 Id. 
19. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” Pepperdine univ. Sch. of law legal Studies 
research Paper Series Paper No. 2009/15 (Feb. 12, 2009), available at http://works.bepress.com/
thomas_stipanowich/1/. “Choice regarding arbitration is too important to be left until the eleventh hour 
of negotiation; process options should be considered and developed ahead of time.” Id. at 58.
20. See Christopher r. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 u. Ill. l. rev. 695, 747. Professor 
Drahozal notes:
 [o]nce a dispute arises, the costs of agreeing to arbitrate combined with a transfer 
payment may be greater than simply settling the case altogether. If both parties benefit 
from arbitration, they can agree to arbitrate without having to put a dollar value on 
those benefits. If the arbitration clause is one-sided, however, so that the corporation 
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 B.  The Lender’s Risk: Credit Card Issuers Confront the Reality of Asymmetrically 
held Information21
 any business entity that extends credit must accommodate “lender’s risk,” defined 
for our purposes as the risk of non-payment. lender’s risk is amplified when the 
debtor’s obligation to repay is unsecured. If a lender becomes aware of opportunistic 
consumer behavior, such as deferment of repayment or simply a default altogether, 
that lender has no choice but to move as quickly as possible to protect itself. obviously, 
information about opportunistic behavior is critical, and until uncovered by the 
lender, it is knowledge in the sole possession of the borrower. 
 How the consequences of this can play out is illustrated by the credit card 
industry. This industry has been the subject of a lot of criticism, most of which is 
based on the assumption that the consumer is victimized by predatory measures, 
including mandatory arbitration imposed by issuers (consumer banks for our purposes) 
in search of unconscionable profits.22 This simplistic assumption fails to give 
recognition to the harsh realities of the marketplace. In this market, mere card use 
obligates the issuer to advance cash without any form of security. Each use creates for 
the issuer a new and separate risk. until any given advance is repaid, the issuer bears 
 gains and the individual loses from arbitration, the corporation will have to make a 
transfer payment to induce the individual to agree to arbitrate. For the individual to 
determine how much to demand, the individual will have to value his or her losses, 
including the possibility of a reduced recovery in arbitration. once the individual makes 
that determination, however, it is only marginally more costly to settle the claim 
altogether, and avoid the further uncertainty of going to arbitration. In other words, 
submission agreements combined with transfer payments may well face much higher 
transactions costs, at least as compared with simply settling the claim.
 Id. See also Peter rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 Geo. J. l & Pub Pol’y 549, 587 (2009). 
Professor rutledge notes:
 Moving from the theoretical discussion to an empirical one, the case against postdispute 
arbitration becomes clearer. at bottom, it just does not work. a variety of empirical 
measures suggest this to be the case. a recent survey of lawyers indicated that an 
overwhelming majority of them would advise their clients not to agree to postdispute 
arbitration. utilization rates tell a similar story, a recent study of aaa employment 
arbitrations by lewis Maltby found that only 6% were post dispute in 2001 and a mere 
2.6% were postdispute in 2002.
 Id.
21. See Paul Bennet Marrow, Non-Negotiable Mandatory Arbitration Clauses: From the Perspective of the 
Drafting Party, 24 alternatives to the High Cost of litigation 164, Issue 10, 164–67 (Nov. 6, 
2006).
22. See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Homo Economicus, Homo Myopicus, and the Law and 
Economics of Consumer Choice: Credit Card Accountability, 73 u. Chi. l. rev. 157 (2006); Carolyn Carter, 
Elizabeth renuart, Margot Saunders & Chi Chi wu, The Credit Card Market and Regulation: In Need of 
Repair, 10 N.C. Banking Inst. 23 (2006); Public Citizen, The Arbitration Trap: How Credit Card 
Companies Ensnare Consumers (2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/arbitrationTrap.
pdf; Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. rptr. 3d 76 (2005). on May 22, 2009, President obama 
signed into law the Credit Card act of 2009. Pub. l. No. 111-24, H.r. res. 627, 111th Cong. (2009) 
(enacted). The stated purpose of this law was to reform numerous practices in the credit card industry. 
The legislation does not address the use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses. See id.
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the entire risk. at the same time, while the debt remains unsatisfied, the user has 
complete control over the quality of the risk, and the user and only the user has 
perfect knowledge about his or her ability and willingness to repay the loan.
 Card issuers want to do business with “good users,” i.e., users who care about 
their credit profile. It is in the issuer’s best interests to take reasonable steps to 
accommodate the good user whenever possible, so long as doing so does not 
undermine the ability to recover any amounts advanced. The good user is likely 
aware of the need to preserve good-user status. The good user knows the value of a 
good credit rating. The good user, like the issuer, is a repeat player who is concerned 
about his or her credit reputation.
 Good users can, and do, encounter circumstances that put their credit worthiness 
in jeopardy. If the good user is silent, the effects of asymmetrically held information 
come into play. But if there is disclosure, the effects of asymmetrically held 
information, for the most part, evaporate. If there is disclosure, the issuer can evaluate 
the risk of non-payment based on current information. wishing to preserve a positive 
business relationship with a good user, the issuer has every reason to assist the user. 
From the issuer’s perspective, the good user need not be penalized just because of a 
change in circumstances. This explains why issuers provide users the option to ask 
for help through a toll-free phone number shown on all credit cards. Employees 
responding to these calls are often given a certain amount of discretion to say yes or 
no. Discretion is a win-win situation. The issuer wins favor for being reasonable and 
the user is able to get help when needed.23
 an issuer’s survival is in large measure predicated upon an ability to find 
meaningful ways to screen out the “bad guys.” Information is the key ingredient for 
success. Still, even the most conscientious issuer has only partial information about 
credit worthiness. Services such as those provided by Equifax Credit Information 
Services, Inc. (www.Equifax.com); Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (www.
Experian.com); and Transunion llC (www.Transunion.com) are a start, but they 
also are far from perfect because the information provided is always about past 
performance.
 To restate the obvious, things change: The user loses a job or incurs an unexpected 
debt for something like medical bills not covered by insurance, etc. So over time, 
even the “good” user can morph into the opportunistic customer with the issuer 
having no forewarning whatsoever.
 There are users who are simply opportunists, and sometimes identifying them at 
the outset is hard to do. This reality is known to every issuer. opportunistic users 
have little regard for their own reputation and are prepared to run up large outstanding 
balances with little intention of meeting the obligation to repay. They are even 
23. See lucian a. Bebchuk & richard a. Posner, Boilerplate in Consumer Contract: One-Sided Contracts in 
Competitive Consumer Contracts, 104 Mich. l. rev. 827, 831–33 (2006). See also Jason Scott Johnston, 
Boiler Plate in Consumer Contract: The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-Form 
Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and Consumers, 104 Mich. l. rev. 857, 
858–59; lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through 
Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich. l. rev. 1724 (2001).
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disposed to frustrating collection in the hope that the issuer will compromise a claim. 
The problem is that the issuer may not be able to identify this type of user until it is 
too late.
 when issuers look at the market, this is some of what they see:
•	 	The	environment	 is	competitive.	There	are	many	 issuers.	Users	
aren’t loyal and can easily establish and terminate relationships 
with multiple issuers.
•	 	Even	 though	 there	 are	many	 potential	 users	 to	 choose	 from,	
issuers can’t always accurately determine who is and who isn’t a 
good potential user. 
•	 	Issuers	know	that	all	potential	users	have	the	potential	to	become	
opportunistic.
•	 	Issuers	 require	 a	mechanism	with	which	 they	 can	 signal	 their	
intentions to counter opportunism in a forceful, expeditious, and 
prompt manner.
•	 	Issuers	know	that	the	judicial	system	is	subject	to	delays	and	not	
user friendly. In the courthouse, summary judgment is rarely 
available.24
•	 	Issuers	 know	 that	 the	 risk	 involved	 can’t	 be	 hedged	 through	
insurance because insurance companies will not assume a risk 
that can’t be quantified and that is likely to become magnified 
without warning.
 obviously, the user holds all the cards until it is time to pay back an outstanding 
balance. So the issuer must always be prepared to move quickly if the user becomes 
opportunistic. The courthouse may not be an attractive option because of formalities 
and delays inherent to the system. and in the courthouse lurks a defendant’s ability 
to cause delay with frivolous counterclaims, excessive demands for disclosure, and 
class action claims. In sum, the issuer sees the court system as being about 
unpredictability, delay, and expense.
 Credit card disputes are uniquely suited to the arbitration process because of the 
limited factual circumstances likely to arise: (1) the card issuer does not advance 
money at the user’s instruction, (2) the user has a Fair Credit Billing act25 claim 
24. Summary judgment is almost never available because of the ability of the user to raise questions of fact 
concerning the accuracy of the size of the claim or even the possibility that there was never a contract 
between the parties because of fraud and identity theft.
25. See generally Fair Credit Billing act of 1974, 15 u.S.C. § 1601 et. seq. The Fair Credit Billing act is an 
amendment to the Truth in lending act of 1968, 15 u.S.C. § 1666(e) (2006). The Truth in lending 
act provides that if an issuer fails to cooperate and correct a billing error, that issuer “forfeits any right 
to collect from the obligor the amount” that is the subject of an alleged error, as well as any associated 
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pending, or (3) the user fails to repay the issuer. That’s pretty much it, except for the 
extremely rare claim that the issuer engaged in a fraud. 
 Issuer-drafted, pre-dispute mandatory clauses are attacked as being procedurally 
unconscionable on the grounds that the cards are made too widely available to 
individuals who have less than sterling credit. It is the “Devil made me do it!” 
argument. But agreeing to advance money for a user with questionable credit doesn’t 
entitle the beneficiary to a free ride. Being willing to assume such a risk doesn’t mean 
that the issuer should be precluded from using any and all lawful means to collect.
 while mandatory arbitration is no panacea, it gives the issuer a greater measure 
of control over timeliness of resolution and the removal or reduction of asymmetrical 
information related risk. The arbitration clause can be tailored to the practical needs 
of the issuer. The rules of the CPr Institute, (“CPr”) the american arbitration 
association (“aaa”), and JaMS all provide for fast-tracked, expedited, or 
streamlined proceedings. The National arbitration Forum (“NaF”) permits a 
document hearing on claims of less than $75,000. Service providers and arbitrators 
handling the case encourage prompt resolution. although not available as a right, 
discovery is tolerated under the arbitrator’s careful watch. In the end, arbitration can 
produce an award in far less time than a comparable courthouse proceeding.26
 The opportunistic user is most likely going to be aware of the benefits of 
arbitration to the issuer. It shouldn’t be a surprise that an opportunistic user would 
attempt to frustrate collection by refusing to agree to arbitration after a default. That 
is why issuers frequently condition use of a credit card on agreements imposing 
mandatory arbitration.
 obvious as it may seem, it’s worth stating that the lender/borrower relationship 
involves nothing more than the obligation to advance money upon demand and an 
obligation to repay the advance on the terms agreed to at the outset. It is simple 
nonsense to claim that repayment of money advanced is unfair or unjust because 
mandatory arbitration as a means to resolve disputes amounts to unjust enrichment. 
 while this discussion has been framed by credit card issuers, the argument has 
broad application to any provider of consumer credit. Many nationwide retail 
operations offer consumer credit on terms that include pre-dispute mandatory 
arbitration clauses. Mandatory arbitration provisions are almost universal in contracts 
between the various telephone companies and their subscribers, vendors for cable and 
satellite television and their subscribers, and contracts involving retail where consumer 
credit is the lifeblood. all of these providers of credit are confronted by the reality of 
asymmetrically held information. If denied the use of tools such as mandatory 
arbitration, the practical effect would be the tightening of standards concerning the 
availability of credit and a contraction in economic activity.
finance charges. “[T]he amount required to be forfeited . . . may not exceed $50.00.” Id. Truth in 
lending act § 1640(a) also gives a cardholder a cause of action for actual damages, statutory damages 
of no more than $1,000 and legal fees. The Federal reserve regulation administering the Truth in 
lending act provisions, known as regulation Z, is at 12 C.F.r. § 226.1.
26. Mark Fellows, The Same Result as in Court, More Efficiently: Comparing Arbitration and Court Litigation 
Outcomes, Metropolitan Corp. Couns., July 2006, at 32.
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 C. Franchises—Asymmetrically held Information and Risks to Reputation
 The franchise business model by definition creates a number of risks for the 
franchisor. The one that is paramount is the risk associated with the reputation of 
the franchisor and other parties associated with a brand. The franchise model is 
structured to create an impression in the mind of the public that the level of service 
and the quality of the goods sold by the franchisee comports to strict standards set by 
the franchisor. In the eyes of the public, the franchisee and the franchisor are one in 
the same. The franchisee is allowed the use of a trademark, confidential and 
proprietary information, and a business structure. The franchisor provides ongoing 
support information about the uniform basket of products or services offered to the 
public. In addition, the franchisor usually provides training and (sometimes) access to 
a line of products manufactured by the franchisor to be sold by the franchisee. The 
franchisor insists on the right to impose standards for the operation of the business 
and to set the bar for the quality of the goods and/or services offered to customers. In 
some cases franchisors even insist on standardized building plans, color schemes, and 
the design and content for signage containing the name and/or trademark of the 
franchisor. Finally, the franchisor grants exclusivity of location for the franchise by 
agreeing not to grant other franchises within a defined geographical area.27
 Key to the relationship is the requirement that the franchisee perform as required 
under the terms of the agreement. Because the arrangement assumes that the 
franchisor will be engaging with others under identical terms, uniformity and 
compliance are essential. a franchisee who fails to comply threatens the reputation 
of not only the franchisor, but all other franchisees in the franchise network.28
27. Christopher r. Drahozal and Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and Arbitration: An Application 
to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. legal Stud. 549, 555–56 (2003); James a. Brickley et al., Contract Duration: 
Evidence from Franchise Contracts 5–6 (univ. of rochester william E. Simon Graduate Sch. of Bus. 
admin., The Bradley Policy research Ctr., Fin. research and Policy, working Paper No. Fr 03-08, 
2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=383700.
28. See Drahozal, supra note 20, at 556.
 There is a fundamental incentive divergence under franchising that results in the 
franchisee investing too little effort in maintenance of brand capital. In the presence of 
a population of mobile consumers who patronize other units in the franchise network, 
an individual franchisee will not capture the full benefits from increasing his level of 
effort. The benefits of such efforts are shared with the franchisor and with other 
franchisees in the network. as a result, the franchisee will tend to exert too little effort 
from the franchisor’s perspective (rubin 1978; Brickley and Dark 1987; Brickley 1999). 
Moreover, the franchisee has an incentive to free ride on the brand’s capital, since he 
captures the full savings from reducing his effort level, while the devaluation of brand 
capital is shared by other units in the network (rubin 1978).
 There are several factors that constrain the franchisee’s incentive to shirk or free ride. 
First, the franchisor will attempt to control the franchisee’s incentives through various 
structural and contractual incentive alignment devices. one structural device is the 
ownership of a large percentage of outlets in the network. Since company-owned outlets 
are less likely to free ride, their presence in the network reduces the overall level of 
shirking. This enables the franchisor to allocate his monitoring effort toward franchised 
units. It may also enhance franchisee incentives by providing a form of “yardstick 
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 The franchisor may have other concerns. Some franchises require the franchisee 
to devote specified amounts of time, effort, and resources. The franchisee may be 
required to evidence an ongoing commitment to the franchise, to invest in a physical 
plant, or to contribute to common costs of the franchise network, like advertising. 
Failure of the franchisee to meet any of these obligations creates a risk to the franchise 
network and may oblige the franchisor to consider whether to cover for the short fall, 
or to terminate the arrangement with the recalcitrant franchisee. For the franchisor, 
just having the ability to quickly terminate the franchise can provide the leverage 
needed to correct objectionable behavior.29 If the franchisor elects to terminate, speed 
becomes essential for minimizing the potential impact of the recalcitrant franchisee 
on the franchise itself. 
 when franchisors look at the market, this is some of what they see:
•	 	Even	though	there	are	often	many	potential	franchisees	to	choose	
from, there is a risk that the selected franchisee will default. 
Information about a given potential franchisee is limited to past 
behavior.
•	 	Even	a	good	franchisee	can	encounter	conditions	that	necessitate	
behaviors that are inconsistent with the commitments made by 
the franchisee. 
•	 	All	franchisees	have	the	latent	potential	to	become	opportunistic	
by seeking a free ride on a brand’s capital.
•	 	Mechanisms	are	 required	to	counter	opportunism	in	a	 forceful,	
efficacious, and prompt manner.
•	 	The	judicial	system	is	subject	to	delays	and	not	user-friendly.	
•	 	The	 risk	 involved	cannot	be	hedged	 through	 insurance	because	
insurance companies do not offer products to insure against the 
failure of a franchisee to comply with the requirements of a 
franchise.
 while franchises may be available to anyone, not everyone is awarded a franchise. 
Judgments about qualifications and credit worthiness are based on information 
provided by an applicant. But as noted throughout this article, information received 
is usually about past behavior and is always subject to unexpected change. To assure 
that at the very least this information remains somewhat current, the franchisor 
requires the franchisee to agree to some form of monitoring. Still, the franchisor may 
competition” with franchised outlets. Company-owned outlets serve as a benchmark for 
comparison to franchised units.
 Id. 
29. Id. at 745–48 (discussing the value of deterrence as a factor for accepting a pre-dispute arbitration 
agreement between sophisticated parties). Id. at 558.
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face a significant lag time between the actual change and discovery by the franchisor 
since the franchisee is the first to know when change will occur and is responsible for 
communicating about the event. During this lag period, there is a heightened 
potential for damage to the reputation of the franchisor and the franchisee.
 The franchisor depends on the franchisee to generate income for the franchisor 
from the operation of the franchise. It is therefore not in the franchisor’s interest to 
terminate a franchise unless there is no other choice. The franchisor has an incentive 
to work with the franchisee and address problems as they arise, provided that the 
franchisor is aware that the franchisee is experiencing some form of difficulty. But 
sometimes termination is the best or only option. Most franchise agreements provide 
for early termination by the franchisor for franchisees’ failure to meet specified 
conditions and obligations. of course having the right to terminate is not the same 
thing as actual termination. absent consent by the franchisee, actual termination 
still requires the sanction of a court or an arbitrator. Between court and arbitration, 
only arbitration is likely to provide the speed and efficiency required to terminate the 
contract, award damages, or both.30
 arbitration can provide additional advantages to a franchisor. The process 
provides the franchisor with the opportunity to select a third party who understands 
the complexities and nuances of the business environment to hear and evaluate the 
case. This is particularly important when the grounds for termination involve 
performance issues. a knowledgeable arbitrator is more likely to see through the 
possible smoke screens advanced by the franchisee to mask inadequate performance. 
with this need in mind, both the CPr and JaMS offer panels of arbitrators who 
specialize in franchise disputes. Specialization can lead to cost savings since the 
specialized arbitrator does not need to be educated on the fine points of the franchise 
business. In contrast, a jury or judge often has little to no specific knowledge of the 
franchise business, and educating them can be an arduous and costly task. Moreover, 
the jury may neither understand nor have the patience to try and understand the 
nature of the franchise business.
30. Id. at 559–60. Consider the following example of a dispute over the amount of effort a franchisee gives 
to his business:
 Franchisors sometimes include provisions in the franchise contract specifying the 
number of hours per week or the specific times the franchisee must spend working at 
his franchised unit (Brickley 1999). These provisions are designed to increase the 
franchisee’s effort level by restricting his outside activities, thereby lowering the 
opportunity cost to the franchisee of exerting effort at his unit (Brickley 1999). In the 
absence of such a provision, it would be difficult to demonstrate to a jury that the 
franchisee violated implicit contractual terms regarding his level of effort. Even with 
such a provision, there are innumerable ways in which a franchisee could comply with 
the hours requirement and yet fail to exert an acceptable level of effort. For example, a 
franchisee required by contract to spend 40 hours per week at his unit could come in at 
off-peak hours or pursue other personal projects while at the unit. Given the difficulties 
in specifying and evaluating effort levels, an arbitration forum could provide substantial 
deterrence benefits to the parties by increasing the accuracy of contractual compliance 
assessments involving the franchisee’s level of effort.
 Id.
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 D. Employment
 The employment arena presents a number of challenges and concerns not found 
in consumer credit and franchising. Most notably, contracts for employment may be 
negotiated in a variety of circumstances, including:
•	 	Negotiated	 one	 on	 one	 between	 an	 employer	 and	 a	 single	
individual. Typically these agreements are negotiated with 
highly-paid executives.
•	 	Negotiated	 by	 a	 union	 and	presented	 to	 all	 employees	who	 are	
members of the union as a condition for employment.
•	 	Not	negotiated,	but	 imposed	by	 the	employer	 as	 a	 condition	of	
employment. These agreements are typically drafted by the 
employer and presented to the employee on a take it or leave it 
basis. This sub-group of agreements sometimes includes terms 
and conditions set forth in a human resource policy manual.
 arbitration clauses are found in all of the different types of employment 
agreements. For purposes of this article, the discussion excludes clauses and claims 
arising from union contracts.
 In disputes involving consumer credit and franchising, the party drafting the 
agreement is typically the plaintiff/claimant. In contrast, in employment litigation, 
the employer—who drafts the terms of the agreement—is usually the defendant/
respondent. and in employment disputes there can be more than one theory for a 
case, i.e., breach of contract and/or a statutory claim, usually for discrimination 
arising outside the terms of the contract. Employment disputes also differ from 
consumer credit and franchising disputes in that some employment claims are 
insurable. These products, designed to address and indemnify the employee for the 
behaviors of the employer, are quite expensive, have large deductibles, and very low 
total coverage limits.
 an employee’s attitude toward the employer is often concealed until an actual 
claim is asserted. The practical effect is to deny the employer an opportunity to 
address employee dissatisfaction as a pre-condition for the assertion of a claim. In 
general, the combination of alternate dispute techniques—particularly arbitration—
with a human resources initiative provides powerful tools to overcome such risks. 
The combination serves to f lush out asymmetrically held information in a constructive 
manner making remediation more likely and reserving arbitration for only the most 
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difficult matters. additional benefits resulting from arbitration are confidentiality, a 
vital aspect of any human resources driven process,31 and speed.32
 Those opposed to mandatory arbitration maintain that it is “unfair” to an 
employee because it can be misused to limit damages, alter the applicable statute of 
31. David Sherwyn, J. Bruce Tracey & Zev J. Eigen, In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment 
Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the Process, 2 u. Pa. 
J. lab. & Emp. l. 73, 98 (1999). as Sherwyn et al. explain:
 The public aspect of litigation is potentially detrimental to employees and employers 
alike. Employer-defendants tear voraciously at the character and integrity of employee-
plaintiffs during long, arduous trials. litigation leaves ample public record not only of 
the employee’s accusations but also of the employer’s. Following the trial, employees 
may be blacklisted, disrespected, and distrusted when they attempt to return to work. 
Employers face the possibility of baseless accusations shattering their reputations that 
may have taken years to develop.
 Id.
32. alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research and Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the Sound and 
Fury?, 11 Empl. rts & Employ. Pol’y J. 405, 425–26 (2007). Colvin elaborates on the comparative 
speed of arbitration:
 an advantage of arbitration compared to litigation that has been widely acknowledged 
is the relatively speedy time to hearing and a final decision in arbitration cases. The 
empirical research confirms the relative efficiency of employment arbitration in this 
regard. Eisenberg and Hill found that the mean time to final disposition for 172 non-
civil-rights-based aaa employment arbitration cases in 1999–2000 was 250 days, 
whereas the mean time to final disposition for 170 non civil rights based state court 
cases from 1996 was 723 days. Similarly, whereas the mean time to final disposition for 
forty-two civil rights based aaa employment arbitration cases in 1999–2000 was 276 
days, the mean time to final disposition was 709 days for 1,430 federal court employment 
discrimination cases from 1999–2000 and 818 days for 163 state court employment 
discrimination cases from 1996. 
 In their study of securities industry arbitration, Delikat and Kleiner also find a speed 
advantage to arbitration over litigation, though the difference is of smaller magnitude 
than in Eisenberg and Hill’s study. whereas the median time from filing to judgment 
in securities industry employment arbitration cases was 16.5 months, with a mean time 
of 20.5 months, in employment discrimination cases in the Southern District of New 
York the median time from filing to judgment was twenty-five months and the mean 
time was 28.5 months. 
 The results from the aaa C-filings data also suggest shorter time periods to obtain a 
hearing in arbitration than is typical in litigation. among 849 cases that involved an 
award, the mean time to a decision was 332.2 days. It is noteworthy that whereas in 
other respects the California-aaa filings suggest a different set of characteristics to 
the emerging system of employment arbitration than the earlier studies, they confirm 
the relative speed of employment arbitration for obtaining a hearing compared to the 
litigation system. 
 Id. an examination of over 300 commercial arbitrations conducted under the auspices of the aaa and 
found that the “average time from filing to final award for the consumer arbitrations studied was 6.9 
months. Cases with business claimants were resolved on average in 6.6 months and cases with consumer 
claimants were resolved on average in 7.0 months.” Christopher r. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, An 
Empirical Study of AAA Consumer Arbitrations 2–3 (Searle Civil Justice Institute and university of Kansas 
School of law, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1365435.
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limitations, alter the burden of proof, and limit discovery. Moreover, opponents of 
mandatory arbitration argue that it is:
•	 	Lawless	because	arbitrators	aren’t	required	to	follow	the	law;
•	 	Conducted	in	secrecy	and	without	written	opinions,	raising	issues	
of bias and prejudice; and
•	 	Foisted	 on	 employees	 by	 contracts	 of	 adhesion	 and	 unequal	
bargaining power.
 If these contentions are accurate, one would expect to find that all employers 
would rush to implement an arbitration system and, yet, this simply is not the case.33 
why?
 one explanation may be that many employers are not sophisticated and are not 
aware of an arbitration option. another reason is that some employers consistently 
obtain better results in court. These employers are “low risk” employers, i.e., they 
have a profile that shows a history of few claims, which is to say they aren’t repeat 
players. Claims against these employers tend to lack merit and are more likely 
disposed of by summary judgment.34 This group of employers is: (1) engaged in 
activities less likely to generate complaints about employer behavior;35 (2) less likely 
to be blind-sided by asymmetrically held information; or (3) located in parts of the 
united States where there are low levels of employee litigation.36 For example, an 
employer with only a few employees is more likely to learn of employee dissatisfaction 
sooner than a large employer with many employees simply because the lines of 
communication in the smaller organization are more direct and information about 
dissatisfaction is less likely to be asymmetric. These are players who also benefit 
from features of the litigation process that aren’t found in arbitration. while empirical 
studies indicate that employees tend to win larger verdicts in court as compared to 
arbitration, the litigation process extends to appeals. The appellate feature not only 
provides the opportunity to lower or even eliminate an award, but it also gives the 
employer the chance to negotiate a lower amount in damages with the employee.37
33. Colvin, supra note 32, at 411. Colvin estimates that the number of employers who have adopted 
arbitration for employment disputes is someplace between 15 and 25%. Id.
34. Baker, supra note 5, at 864, 880–82. one study found that 60% of all employment cases brought in 
federal courts are resolved on summary judgment. lewis l. Maltby, Employment Arbitration and 
Workplace Justice, 38 u.S.F.l. rev. 105, 112–13 (2003). when employers make the summary judgment 
motion, they prevail 98% of the time. Id. In state courts, employers making such motions prevail only 
15% of the time. Id. 
35. Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantages From Using Mandatory Arbitration for 
Discrimination Claims, 31 rutgers l. J. 399, 418–67 (2000); see Baker, supra note 5, at 864, 880–82.
36. Colvin, supra note 32, at 412.
37. Colvin, supra note 32, at 423. Colvin elaborates:
 The data on litigation outcomes ref lect the conventional wisdom that there are a small 
number of large verdicts, with the result that the studies find much higher mean than 
median award amounts. However, in litigation there also exists the ability to appeal the 
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 as for the remaining employers, there is ample evidence that their motives for 
insisting on arbitration have little to do with being “unfair” to their employees. when 
these employers look at an available labor pool, this is some of what they see:
•	 	Accurate	 reference	 information	 about	 job	 applicants	 is	 often	
difficult to obtain because sophisticated employers are aware they 
can be sued for sharing negative information about a former 
employee. Many employers by policy will provide only 
confirmation of dates of tenure. 
•	 	The	vetting	process,	no	matter	how	complete	and	sophisticated,	
only tells the employer about past behavior.
•	 	How	a	potential	employee	will	adjust	to	and	perform	within	the	
environment provided by the employer is not knowable until an 
individual is actually performing within that environment.
•	 	Determining	 employees’	 attitudes	 toward	 the	 employer,	 toward	
their fellow employees, and toward the environment created by 
the employer can be difficult and expensive.
•	 	The	reluctance	of	an	employee	to	divulge	information	about	his/
her attitudes and perceptions about the workplace can frustrate 
the employer’s ability to address concerns and complaints.
•	 	Factors	 resulting	 in	 low	 employee	morale,	 unless	 known	 and	
addressed by an employer, can interfere with the efficient 
operation of a business, undermine the ability of the employer to 
compete in the marketplace, and in extreme situations, result in 
an interruption of the business.
 against this backdrop, an employer’s offer for employment always carries a 
number of risks arising from unknowns about the employee’s inclination to bring a 
claim. The employer lacks knowledge as to an employee’s (1) perceptions about what 
is and what isn’t inappropriate employer behavior, (2) willingness to voluntarily 
submit to a form of alternate dispute resolution, (3) ability to understand and enforce 
his or her rights, and (4) ability to hire a lawyer.38
 once an employee is hired, there are still a number of unknowns. as the employee 
begins to interact with other employees while unmonitored by the employer, his or 
verdict and many larger damage awards are reduced on appeal. Even in the absence of 
an appellate hearing, the employer may be able to get the employee to accept a lower 
amount than the damages award in settlement to avoid the possibility of appeal. lewis 
Maltby has estimated that this may reduce the amount ultimately received by employees 
from jury awards by half.
 Id.
38. See Baker, supra note 5, at 873.
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her attitude can be affected both positively and negatively. The employee, and the 
employee alone, is aware of his or her tolerances and prejudices, which may become 
known to the employer only after a complaint has been made.39
 lipsky et al. have found that in the employment arena, avoidance of litigation is 
the key driver for the implementation of a dispute resolution system.40 This seems 
reasonable considering that employers are, first and foremost, committed to running 
their business. In extreme circumstances, poor employee morale can lead to the 
diminished ability to compete, and to business interruptions—strikes being a case in 
point. Most employers compete in a commercial environment that is intolerant of 
business interruptions; if an interruption occurs, customers simply go some place 
else. Monitoring for behaviors among employees that suggest dissatisfaction is 
challenging, rarely effective, and is almost always very expensive. litigation in any 
form is more than a distraction; it’s very costly in time and resources. Many employers 
have concluded that this risk is best addressed by the implementation of a dispute 
resolution system designed to f lush out asymmetrically held information, provide for 
an opportunity to correct problems, foster settlement, and relegate only the most 
stubborn claims to evaluation by a third party. 
 Clearly, employers have an incentive to resolve issues involving employee 
dissatisfaction as soon and efficiently as possible. as a matter of policy, many human 
resource departments require that employees with a complaint take steps in attempt 
to resolve the problems at hand as a precondition to seeking the intervention of a 
court or an arbitrator. Employees are typically required to (1) work with their 
management to resolve the dispute, (2) if the issues are not resolved, allow intervention 
39. Id., at 873–74. Professor Baker makes the following point about the value of mandatory arbitration for 
managing risk:
 In the conventional debate, commentators on both sides miss the chief benefit of 
mandatory arbitration—managing risk. Commentators have a simple discrimination 
story in mind—the employer discriminates and the employee sues. This story neglects 
the randomness of most discrimination claims and, hence, the interaction of risk and 
mandatory arbitration. Two factors contribute to the uncertainty of discrimination 
claims.
 First, before hiring, the employer cannot assess the applicant’s proclivity to file suit. 
The applicant’s decision to file turns on a host of factors, many of which the employer 
is unable to predict. These factors—which vary from applicant to applicant—include: 
(1) the applicant’s perceptions about what constitutes discrimination; (2) the applicant’s 
willingness to subject herself to dispute resolution; (3) the applicant’s ability to read, 
understand, and enforce her rights; and (4) the applicant’s ability to retain an attorney. 
 Second, after hiring, the employer does not have complete control over the activities of 
its employees. The divergence between the interests and preferences of many of the 
employees and the interests of the employer, combined with imperfect monitoring, 
means that employers cannot eliminate the chance of actual discrimination or the 
perception of discrimination in the workplace.
 Id.
40. David B. lipsky, ronald l. Seeber & richard D. Fincher, Emerging Systems for Managing 
workplace Conflict: lessons from american Corporations for Managers and Dispute 
resolution Professionals 58–61, 75–76 (Jossey-Bass 2003).
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by human resource professionals, and (3) if these steps don’t work, submit the matter 
to mediation. 
 Consider also the possibility of the “appellate effect” suggested by Professor Hill. 
when arbitration is linked to other dispute resolution measures, usually by larger 
employers who are “repeat players,” those procedures serve to filter out and resolve 
meritorious cases leaving only the less-meritorious matters for “appeal” to an arbitrator 
for final resolution.41 arbitration, especially when combined with mediation, provides 
an opportunity for an employee to air the complaint in a timely fashion, obtain a 
hearing,42 and if need be, a determination from an arbitrator.43 The reality of the 
41. See Elizabeth Hill, Due Process at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration Under the 
Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 ohio St. J. on Disp. resol. 777, 817–18 (2003). Hill 
looked at thirty-four cases involving a repeat player employer:
 Eighty-eight percent of these repeat players were employers with nationally known 
names, which are likely to process a relatively large number of cases. The employers in 
74% of those cases (25 cases) maintained an in-house dispute resolution program (DrP) 
culminating in aaa arbitration. The win-loss ratio for this 74% of cases was 3.2, a full 
190% higher than the 1.3 win-loss ratio for employers over-all. on the other hand, the 
remaining 26% of repeat employer cases (9 cases) involved employers who did not 
maintain in-house DrPs. Their win-loss ratio was only 1.25, just slightly below the 1.3 
win-loss ratio for employers over-all. In short, the “repeat player effect” does not exist 
where the repeat player does not maintain an in-house DrP. Thus, the “appellate 
Effect” appears to be the result of the selection processes of large employers’ in-house 
DrPs, not merely the by-product of large employers’ repeat appearances at arbitration.
 The “appellate effect theory” is further confirmed by a reading of the 25 individual cases 
which do manifest the “repeat player effect.” They are indeed, of little or [no] merit. a 
reading of these awards reveals that over half, 56%, were without any merit. an additional 
20% had some merit, but were properly denied. Thus, a total of 76% of the claims fall into 
the category of no merit or little merit, supporting the theory that the DrPs of repeat 
player employers push cases of questionable merit to the final step of external appellate 
review under the auspices of aaa, producing a higher than average rate of dismissal.
 Id.
42. Maltby, supra note 34, at 113. Professor Maltby found that in the aaa employment arbitrations he 
sampled, all employees wishing a hearing were provided the opportunity. Id.
43. Colvin, supra note 32, at 438. Colvin elaborates on several studies showing that arbitration can be a 
viable substitute for litigation:
 These studies ref lect the reality that employment arbitration was developed as and 
serves the function of an alternative to the litigation system for resolving employment 
law claims. Yet employment arbitration is also frequently adopted by organizations as 
part of their internal dispute resolution procedures used to resolve the conf licts that 
inevitably arise in work and employment relations. In addition to serving as the 
mechanism for resolving potential employment law claims, in this role employment 
arbitration serves as the final appeal stage for complaints or grievances brought by 
employees through the earlier stages in the internal procedures. For this reason, 
employment arbitration can also be viewed as part of what have been described as 
organizational Dispute resolution (oDr) systems, including various other dispute 
resolution procedures the organization may have adopted, such as peer review panels, 
internal or external mediation, management appeal boards, or ombudspersons. where 
employment arbitration is introduced as the final step in an oDr system for nonunion 
employees, it is fulfilling a structural role more akin to that of labor arbitration in the 
grievances of union procedures. although we should not jump to the conclusion that 
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appellate effect is confirmed by studies showing lower win rates for employees 
seeking arbitration based on personnel manuals than employees with claims arising 
from individually negotiated employment agreements.44 and the presence of 
asymmetrically held information in circumstances confronting the employer serves 
to extinguish the value of the appellate effect.
 But there is a price to be paid by all parties. For the employer, it is the possibility 
that the employee win rate will go up in arbitration, and the potential for the 
employee to receive a more favorable consideration as to the merits of the claim than 
might be the case in a court. The price paid by the employee for the ability to resolve 
disputes through remediation and settlement, and with freedom from the appeals 
process, is a system in which they are more likely to receive a lesser award than might 
be the case in court. This argument is supported by the empirical data reported on 
elsewhere in this article.45
 In sum, asymmetrically held information can, and often does, unfairly tilt the 
playing field, and efforts to reform arbitration under the Faa must recognize this 
concern. a wholesale ban on the enforcement of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration 
clauses would serve to permanently reset the playing field in a manner that would 
discourage commercial intercourse and impair growth in the economy. In the 
following discussion, we will look in greater detail at the tone and content of the calls 
for reform. 
III.  USING EMPIRICAL RESEARCH TO EVALUATE FAIRNESS: FILTERING MUDDY 
WATERS
 as I noted in the introduction to this article, there is a tension between those 
who see arbitration in any form as a procedurally inferior and biased process for 
dispute resolution and those who see it as a practical and efficient technique that 
facilitates their ability to do business in sometimes unpredictably treacherous 
circumstances. That tension is best understood within the framework of what the 
antagonists perceive to be “fair” and “unfair.”
 It’s hard to argue that determinations about “fairness” are not subjective. what is 
and isn’t fair might have a lot to do with whose ox is being gored. of course, just 
because an ox is being poked at doesn’t mean that doing so is actually unfair. 
Circumstances may exist requiring it and an absolute assumption that the poor 
creature’s owner will always be resistant might be without any foundation. So it 
follows that within the context of the debate about the propriety of predispute 
employment arbitration does, or perhaps even should, function similarly to labor 
arbitration, this shift in perspective poses different questions about how we evaluate the 
operation and impact of employment arbitration. while the research in this area is 
more limited, some studies have begun to address these issues.
 Id. (internal references omitted).
44. Mark C. weidemaier, From Court-Surrogate to Regulatory Tool: Re-Framing the Empirical Study of 
Employment Arbitration, 41 u. Mich. J. l. reform 843, 856 (2008).
45. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
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mandatory arbitration in commercial settings, assuming for all purposes per se 
unfairness is without merit. It’s better to rely on empirical evidence of actual attitudes 
and circumstances.46 In this section, I present evidence developed from a series of 
empirical studies designed to test for actual attitudes and to contain subjectivity. It 
should become clear that even though the evidence isn’t conclusive and isn’t complete, 
the weight is tipping toward the conclusion that mandatory arbitration is an 
appropriate means to dispute resolution.
 A. Basic Arguments
 The emphasis here is on the word “fair.” at least on the surface, to those who 
oppose the process, mandatory arbitration is first and foremost patently unfair. They 
insist that at the core, mandatory arbitration is imposed (1) as an impenetrable barrier 
to class action litigation discouraging anyone with a minor grievance from seeking 
redress, and (2) as a fail safe mechanism to insure that any consumer, with the 
fortitude to nevertheless persist, will find himself/herself before a forum that is anti-
consumer, anti-franchisee, and anti-employee. These opponents assume that with 
these givens about mandatory arbitration, anyone upon whom the process is imposed 
will always find it to be “unfair.” These groups literally have no use whatsoever for 
mandatory arbitration in particular, and arbitration in general.47 They propose that 
legislation banning the enforcement of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses is 
the optimal solution.
46. Not everyone agrees with this conclusion. Professor David Schwartz argues that reliance on an empirical 
approach for the determination of fairness is f lawed and is a “clever rhetorical strategy” designed to 
frustrate efforts to reform the F.a.a. David Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 Notre 
Dame l. rev. 1247 (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1401469. 
“Interposing the empirical question as a hurdle to legislative reform would be a strategic victory for 
mandatory arbitration supporters, because there is a good likelihood that a definitive answer is years 
away and perhaps unattainable.” Id. “Behavioral evidence” is not defined any place in the article. See id. 
Professor Schwartz basis his arguments on the conclusion that the empirical studies reported to date 
reveal little of value:
 Ten years of empirical research into the fairness of mandatory arbitration have produced 
only a handful of empirical studies, and these have told us very little. The studies, 
which compare win rates and average monetary awards in arbitration hearings and 
trials, are fraught with problems and objections: small data sets, an overreliance on data 
from aaa arbitrations, and skewed samples. also, they deal almost exclusively with 
employment and not consumer cases, which may be significantly different. Finally, it is 
far from clear that any researcher will be able to design a study that will overcome the 
fundamental problem in comparing arbitrated and litigated “outcomes” in this way: 
cases that wind up going to trial and to arbitration may systematically differ from each 
other and even from the overall mix of claims filed and resolved through their respective 
(litigation and arbitration) systems.
 Id. at 1283. 
47. See richard a. alderman, Why We Really Need the Arbitration Fairness Act: It’s All About Separation of 
Powers, 12 J. Consumer & Com. l. 151, 154 (2009) (arguing that “[a]rbitration is not about relocating 
or simplifying consumer dispute resolution; it is about eliminating consumer disputes and controlling 
resolution.”). 
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 on the other hand, those who champion the process argue that arbitration is 
more efficient, faster, and more economical than the judicial system.48 They also 
argue that because the providers of arbitration services49 have adopted rules and 
procedures designed to insure fairness and due process (the so-called “Protocols”), 
and because courts routinely screen agreements for procedural and substantive 
unconscionability, mandatory arbitration is as fair as, or perhaps even superior to, 
traditional litigation.50 They believe that absent conclusive evidence that the 
48. See lee Goldman, Contractually Expanded Review of Arbitration Awards, 8 Harv. Negotiation l. rev. 
171 (2003). Consider the argument that the dispute is resolved faster by arbitration:
 arbitration, a contract-based form of dispute resolution, is increasingly popular because 
it allows the parties to avoid court litigation and structure dispute resolution in a 
manner that best suits each party’s needs. Parties can choose the decision-maker, define 
her powers, select the procedures to be used, and decide whether a written opinion is 
required. as such, arbitration can be faster, cheaper and more private than litigation.
 Id.; see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 u.S. 614, 628 (1985). The 
court recognized that:
 By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights 
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a 
judicial, forum. It trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom 
for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.
 Id. (emphasis added). In arbitration, claims are resolved in months, rather than years, which is usually 
the time needed in the judicial system. Fischer and Haydock explain:
 The arbitration process is typically measured in months instead of the years it can take 
to resolve disputes in the litigation system. Because of the f lexibility and adaptability of 
arbitration, it is generally quicker and more efficient than litigation. Trials are dictated 
by detailed rules and proceedings that have evolved to accommodate an extremely broad 
array of disputes in society. arbitration procedures have developed as a streamlined 
alternative to provide fast, fair and final resolutions.
 robert Donald Fischer and roger S. Haydock, International Commercial Disputes Drafting an Enforceable 
Arbitration Agreement, 21 wm. Mitchell l. rev. 941, 954 (1996). This is because the rules of the 
arbitration facilitators usually don’t provide an absolute right to discovery and motion practice because 
these mechanisms are likely to cause delay. Instead, the arbitrator must grant permission for the parties 
to proceed with discovery and motion practice. By contrast, in state and federal judicial systems, where 
parties have the right to seek discovery and make motions, the judge will intervene only to control 
abuse. For an advocate who needs a quick result, arbitration is a practical means to an end. See id.
49. This article is limited to the following facilitators: american arbitration association (“aaa”), 
International Institute for Conf lict Prevention and resolution (“CPr”), JaMS, Financial Industry 
regulatory authority (“FINra”), and National arbitration Forum (“NaF”).
50. rutledge, supra note 20, at 563–64. The employment protocol sets forth a variety of rights including:
[T]he •	 employee’s right to be represented by a person of her own choosing; 
 the •	 employer is encouraged to pay at least a share of the employee’s fees; employees 
should have access to all information reasonably relevant to their claims; before 
selecting an arbitrator, parties should have sufficient information to contact parties 
who previously have appeared before her;
arbitrators •	 should have sufficient skill and knowledge;
arbitrators •	 should be drawn form a diverse background;
 arbitrators •	 should be free of any relationships that would create an actual or apparent 
conflict of interest;
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advantages they perceive don’t actually exist, it is “unfair” to bar them from using 
arbitration to do business in a manner that is reasonable and appropriate given the 
risks that they must contend with. The proponents suggest that there is no need for 
any legislation, much less legislation banning the use of pre-dispute mandatory 
arbitration clauses.
 Beneath the surface there is a darker side that is rarely talked about. For both 
sides in the debate, the bedrock issue is overreaching. Many engaged in providing 
consumer credit, franchising, and employment (collectively “advocates”) are concerned 
that those with whom they do business will become opportunistic and overreach so 
as to create risks that are unforeseen, unpredictable, and worse yet, uninsurable. For 
the advocates, arbitration is looked to as a tool to level the playing field—as a vehicle 
for modulating the impact of the unanticipated risks. For their part, many consumers 
of credit, franchisees, and employees (collectively “opponents”) fear that arbitration 
will be used as a weapon to extract unwarranted financial gain in an arena where the 
opponent has no chance to prevail.
 B. Digging Deeper
 So, is mandatory arbitration a fair process? resolving this question is potentially 
impossible if one takes into account nothing other than hyperbole, speculation, 
unsubstantiated assumptions, and anecdotal evidence. In recent years, efforts have 
been made by the academic community to settle the matter by relying on empirical 
evidence culled from carefully designed studies. while the results are inconclusive, 
the cumulative weight of these studies points toward the conclusion that arbitration 
is perceived as a fair process.51 unfortunately, while further empirical examination 
may be needed to shed more light on the matter, criticism based on hyperbole, 
speculation, unsubstantiated assumptions, and anecdotal evidence continues to 
overshadow the debate.
  1. Hyperbole, Speculation and Anecdotal Evidence
 Those who oppose arbitration don’t appear to have much to say when it comes to 
trying to use empirical evidence to undermine the arguments of the proponents. 
 the •	 employee’s entitlement to the same array of remedies in arbitration as she would 
be entitled to in a judicial proceeding.
 Id. rutledge further explains:
 Subsequent protocols governing consumer disputes and health care disputes differ in 
some of the specifics but contain the same basic protections. Many of the major 
arbitration associations have committed to administering arbitrations in the consumer 
and employment areas only if the parties agreed to be bound by the protocols.
 Id.
51. See amy Schmitz, Curing Consumer Warranty Woes Through Regulated Arbitration, 23 ohio St. J. on 
Disp. resol. 627 (2008). “Moreover, the limited empirical studies of arbitration outcomes available 
indicate that individuals may not benefit from a ban on arbitration agreements because arbitration is 
faster and cheaper than litigation, and may provide individuals with higher recovery rates than they 
would obtain in court.” Id. at 629–30. 
213
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VoluME 54 | 2009/10
Instead, they simply argue that (1) by its very nature, mandatory arbitration is unfair 
and denies due process;52 and (2) there is no substance in the arguments raised by 
those favoring the process. 53 The opponents claim that the process doesn’t actually 
yield the benefits suggested by those who support it, and that the empirical evidence 
is unclear as to whether all of these benefits universally exist. Further, the opponents 
argue that if these benefits don’t really exist, and they maintain that they don’t, then 
the real motivation for insisting on arbitration is that it is a stacked deck, one that is 
stacked against the consumer, the franchisee, and the employee. Countering this 
argument, the proponents note that what is uncontested is their belief that mandatory 
arbitration provides them with these benefits in most of the disputes they have with 
those they do business with. Therefore, they maintain that absent conclusive empirical 
proof, these benefits are real and that it would be unfair to deny them the right to do 
business as they see fit.54
 The claim by the opponents that empirical evidence is inconclusive might be a 
double-edged sword. Empirical evidence supporting the validity of the opponents’ 
concerns is noticeably very thin,55 forcing them to rely on hyperbole,56 assumptions, 
52. See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Arbitration, 67 law & Contemp. Probs. 133 
(2004); Drahozal, supra note 20; Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total 
Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 Mich. l. rev. 373 (2005); ware, supra note 13.
53. rutledge, supra note 20, at 570. Professor rutledge summarizes the argument nicely:
 according to the argument, arbitration clauses coupled with class action waivers 
effectively deny claimants any opportunity for meaningful relief. The arbitration clause 
takes them out of court, depriving them of the procedural advantages (such as discovery 
and a jury); the class action waiver eliminates the opportunity to aggregate small claims, 
thereby eliminating the incentive for any private party (much less any attorney) to 
prosecute the case.
 Id.
54. Professor Schwartz maintains that this “burden” shifting argument is just wrong:
 The logic of this argument is where there’s no smoke, there’s no fire. To be sure, if a 
well-conceived and diligent search turns up no evidence of a condition, then that can 
support an inference that the condition does not exist. But the search must be thorough 
enough for that inference to cross the threshold from “I didn’t find it in this spot” to 
“we’re probably not going to find it anywhere.”
. . . .
 The “no evidence” claim also ref lects an additional rhetorical move. Its clear implication 
is that the existing evidence is insufficient to shift from a regime of enforcement to one 
of nonenforcement of predispute arbitration agreements. Thus, the claim sub silentio 
imposes a burden of proof on the critics of mandatory arbitration. what justification is 
there to place the burden of proof on critics?
 Schwartz, supra note 46, at 1259–60.
55. lisa B. Bingham, Why Suppose? Let’s Find Out: A Public Policy Research Program on Dispute Resolution, 
2002 J. Disp. resol. 101 (2002); Drahozol, supra note 20, at 720–21.
56. For an example of how far afield these arguments can go, consider what one author had to say about the 
inability of arbitrators who happen to be situated outside “large urban” areas to adequately grasp federal 
and state laws applicable to consumer transactions:
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and conclusions drawn mostly from anecdotal evidence of abuse, which they posit as 
proof that arbitration is unfair.57 and the rhetoric can become quite shrill.
 For example, one noted author warns that “[t]he Supreme Court has created a 
monster”58 and describes the process as “‘despotic decision making’ in the sense that 
the governing law makes arbitrator’s decisions virtually unreviewable while accepting 
procedural and substantive results that would be considered unfair in a judicial 
setting.”59 He also suggests that pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses “are, in 
substance, immaterial to the core of the transaction, which would typically center on 
price or, in an employment contract, wages.”60 The motivation for the imposition of 
such draconian methods is said to be the selfish desire to reduce transaction costs, to 
transfer risk to the party upon whom arbitration is imposed, and to secure a forum 
where the deck is stacked in favor of the party imposing the process. 61 
 In addition to the problems posed by limited discovery, it may be difficult to find 
qualified persons to sit as arbitrators of claims based on these statutes, especially outside 
large urban areas. These are very difficult cases. First, the subject matter is complex. a 
simple loan transaction may involve principal, interest charges, points or various other 
front-end charges, and fees of many types including recording fees, appraisal fees, and 
late fees. In a typical case involving claims of usury as well as Truth in lending act 
violations, the arbitrator will have to know state usury law, which may vary depending 
upon whether the loan is covered by the state’s retail installment act, motor vehicle 
retail installment act, or small loan act. The Truth in lending act has its own concepts 
in which the finance charge is altogether different from the interest rate. In addition, 
the statutes themselves often are only the starting point. State credit laws frequently are 
supplemented by state banking regulations. The federal statutes are supplemented by 
regulations and official commentary, both of which change periodically.
 Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial Institutions: A 
Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 ohio St. J. on Disp. resol. 267, 314–15 (1995).
57. See Samuel Issacharoff & Erin Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 u. Chi. l. rev. 157, 172–73 
(2006) (reporting the individual story of Joseph Bellavia); see also David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small 
Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 
1997 wis. l. rev. 33, 40–53 (1997).
58. Schwartz, supra note 46, at 36.
59. Id. at 38. The author refers to Justice Steven’s dissent in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrystler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 u.S. 614, 657 (1985).
60. Schwartz, supra note 46, at 56–57.
61. Professors Issacharoff and Delaney summarize nicely:
 Given the motivation for profit maximization, it seems inevitable that, absent regulation, 
companies will seek to take advantage of consumers’ irrational behavior by manipulating 
arbitration clauses together with other aspects of consumer contracts.
 Every indication is that the imposed arbitration clauses are nothing but a shield against 
legal accountability by the credit card companies.
 Issacharoff, supra note 22, at 173. The lack of empirical evidence doesn’t mean that there is no basis for 
concern. Perceptions of unfairness are a powerful force that can’t be dismissed out of hand. See generally 
Barbara Black and Jill Gross, Perceptions of Fairness of Securities Arbitration: An Empirical Study, Report to 
the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration 1 (univ. of Cincinnati C. of law, Pub. law & Theory 
research Paper Series No. 08-01 Feb. 6, 2008), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1090969.
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 Courts have even gotten into the act. Consider the following statement offered 
by a bankruptcy judge: “The reality that the average consumer frequently loses his/
her constitutional rights and right of access to the court when he/she buys a car, 
household appliance, insurance policy, receives medical attention or gets a job rises as 
a putrid odor which is overwhelming to the body politic.”62
 a recent study issued by Public Citizen focusing on perceived abuses in the credit 
card industry proclaimed that binding arbitration is “big business” with credit card 
companies paying large sums to facilitators such as the aaa and NaF. These 
payments are said to be used to compensate compliant arbitrators willing to issue 
rubberstamp rulings against any and all card users. “The method is to isolate and 
conquer, as the cloak of secrecy makes it impossible to see the full picture of corporate 
wrongdoing or to use the public courts to stop it.”63
 Statements such as these are unquestionably inflammatory. reliance on emotional 
triggers to defeat mandatory arbitration is unfortunate, less than intellectually honest, 
distracting, and capable of interfering with sound judicial reasoning.64 
62. Knepp v. Credit acceptance Corp., 229 B.r. 821, 827 (Bankr. N.D. ala. 1999).
63. Public Citizen, supra note 22, at 4. The Public Citizen report elaborated:
 Binding mandatory arbitration is wholly distinct from post-dispute arbitration, 
nonbinding arbitration and mediation or other forms of alternative dispute resolution, 
particularly because agreements to use them are made after a dispute arises, not before 
and as a condition of receiving the good or service.
 Binding mandatory arbitration is big business. Binding mandatory arbitration clauses 
are found in most boilerplate contracts for everyday needs, including auto insurance, as 
well as nursing homes or other services like cable television. To receive a good or service, 
the consumer must sign the contract. according to a legal brief filed by the Chamber of 
Commerce of the united States in a 2006 Supreme Court case, BMa clauses are in 
millions of consumer contracts across the united States.
 Many consumers would be shocked to learn that a binding mandatory arbitration clause 
buried in the fine print strips them of their constitutional right to a trial by jury and an 
impartial judge.
 How is the system rigged? First, credit card and other companies drive millions of 
dollars in business to arbitration firms, which in turn hire arbitrators to rubberstamp 
rulings that favor business and then pass many of the costs onto the consumer. The 
evidence proves that BMa stacks the deck to favor corporate interests over consumers.
 . . . .
 Safeguards built into the justice system are not found in binding mandatory 
arbitration.
 Id. (internal citations omitted). Public Citizen is a respected non-profit organization that 
advocates on behalf of consumers. about Public Citizen, http://www.citizen.org/about/ (last 
visited oct. 4, 2009). 
64. See omri Ben-Shahar, Symposium: Empirical Studies of Mandatory Arbitration: Introduction: How Bad are 
Mandatory Arbitration Terms?, 41 u. Mich. J.l. reform 777 (2008). For proof of “the paucity of 
empirical knowledge,” Professor Ben-Shahar points to some comments made by the judiciary in the 
often cited opinions of Armendaris v. Foundation Health Psychare, 24 Cal 4th 83 (Cal. 2000) and oblix, 
Inc. v. winiecki, 374 F. 3d 488 (7th Cir. 2004). Ben-Shahar notes that in Armendaris, the California 
Supreme Court concluded that arbitration is an unfavorable forum for employees based on win rates, 
citing as support for that generalization just two published studies. Ben-Shahar notes that in Oblix, Inc., 
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 Hyperbole aside, empirical studies have looked at a number of markers thought to 
measure fairness. These include studies comparing performance before courts and 
arbitrators as evidenced by win rates,65 rates of usage and time, and cost comparisons, 
to name but a few. Parties on both sides of the issue have generated empirical studies.
 as I have already noted,66 not everyone is sanguine about reliance on empirical 
evidence to answer the question: Is mandatory arbitration a fair process? For example, 
Professor Sternlight maintains that there are at least three (3) core problems with the 
ability of researchers to properly evaluate empirical evidence: 
1.  researches can’t obtain access to the data they need for a good 
study;
2.  Even if available, the data can’t be properly compared with 
courthouse results; and
3.  The approach of looking at and comparing win rates and the size 
of awards/judgments doesn’t tell the whole story because no 
consideration is given to other factors that might influence the 
decision to go to court or arbitration, thus obscuring the 
differences between the two possibilities. 67
 The studies discussed in the subsections that follow should put to rest these 
concerns. 
the 7th Circuit reached the opposite conclusion based on just one empirical study. Ben-Shahar 
observes:
 Surely, one’s view about the empirical reality of arbitration—on how well claimants fare 
relative to litigation—is not the only relevant factor in evaluating the legality of 
arbitration clauses. For example, one might think that arbitration is bad but that 
arbitration clauses cannot be vacated under state contract law or the Federal arbitration 
act. But it is striking that many of the attempts to justify the competing views on 
legality are based on alleged empirical underpinnings. unfortunately, these 
underpinnings have not been fully developed to provide the desired foundations. we 
simply do not know enough facts to pass a judgment on arbitration as a mandatory 
procedure.
 Id. at 778–79.
65. raw win-rate studies generally have shown that claimants do quite well. See Maltby, supra note 34, at 
110 (according to data aggregated from a variety of studies, employees prevailed 62% of the time in 
proceedings before the aaa); California Dispute resolution Institute, Consumer and Employment 
arbitration in California: a review of website Data Posted Pursuant to Section 1281.96 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure (august 2004), available at http://www.mediate.com/cdri/cdri_print_aug_6.pdf. 
Comparative win rate studies, which compare win rates in arbitration to win rates in litigation, show a 
similar trend. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Richshaws: The Stakes in the Debate Over Predispute 
Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 ohio St. J. Disp. resol. 559, 564–65 (2001); David Sherwyn, 
Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for 
Empirical Research, 57 Stan. l. rev. 1557, 1569 (2005).
66. Schwartz, supra note 46, at 1259–60.
67. Sternlight, supra note 10, at 1658.
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  2. Empirical Studies: The “Rate” Wars
 The anti-arbitration forces often point to win-rate data to support their 
conclusions.68 For example, the Public Citizen study, mentioned above, relies on an 
analysis that Public Citizen conducted using raw numbers provided by the National 
arbitration Forum for its activities in California during the period from January 1, 
2003 to March 31, 2007 (34,000 cases are claimed to have been reported by NaF 
and “crunched” by Public Citizen).69 Public Citizen concluded:
all but 118 of the cases were card/finance companies or firms that purchase 
their debts. In other words, consumers chose to bring only 118 cases before 
NaF while corporations chose this business friendly forum nearly 34,000 
times—99.6 percent of the total cases.
In the more than 19,000 cases in which an NaF-appointed arbitrator was 
involved, 94 percent of decisions were for business. . . . 
In sum, we found that the privatization of our justice system through pre-
dispute BMa (binding mandatory arbitration) is being pushed by business 
interests well aware of its perils for consumers. BMA is, in fact, a deliberate 
strategy to substitute a secret, pro-business kangaroo court for an open trial on the 
merits of a claim. The courts provide little protection from this increasing threat. 70 
(Emphasis and definition added).
 “rate” data comes in a variety of forms, many of which are used to undermine 
the belief that arbitration is fair because it is fast, efficient, and economical. Consider 
a recent study by Eisenberg et al. comparing arbitration usage rates.71 The authors 
collected consumer agreements with mandatory arbitration clauses drafted and 
frequently used by a group of “large” corporations. They then searched the files of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) for the same corporations and 
68. See, e.g. Public Citizen, supra note 22, at 1. Professor rutledge also describes the problem with win rate 
data:
 raw win rates are, however, a relatively poor method by which to answer the “better 
off ” question. For one thing, standing alone, they offer relatively little insight into how 
the claimant would have fared in litigation. Furthermore, anyone interpreting these 
results must closely consider how the researchers define a “win.” an arbitration might 
award a claimant $ 100 (thereby qualifying as a “win” according to some reports), yet, if 
the claimant were seeking $ 100,000, such a paltry sum could hardly be considered a 
good outcome if the claimant had a meritorious claim.
 rutledge, supra note 21, at 557.
69. Public Citizen, supra note 22, at 1.
70. Public Citizen, supra note 22, at 1–3.
71. Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An Empirical 
Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 u. Mich. J.l. reform 871 
(2008).
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reviewed numerous negotiated agreements72 deemed by the SEC to be material to 
operations. Next they compared the consumer contracts with the negotiated contracts 
to see if the arbitration clause usage rate in negotiated agreements was anywhere near 
the number found in the consumer contracts.73 The data revealed that over 75% of 
the consumer agreements reviewed contained mandatory arbitration clauses and over 
90% of the employment agreements reviewed contained such a clause. In contrast, 
less than 10% of the negotiated contracts contained an arbitration clause,74 leading to 
the conclusion that the companies involved were disingenuous about their open 
embrace of arbitration.75 From this the authors conclude: “our data support the 
inference that the companies . . . do not view consumer arbitration as offering a 
superior combination of cost savings, expeditious decision-making, consistency, and 
justice. rather, they view consumer arbitration as a way to save money, by avoiding 
aggregate dispute resolution”76
 The Public Citizen and Eisenberg studies are indicative of the many that have 
appeared recently in the literature.77 The general tone and import is the same: “large” 
companies rely on arbitration to defeat consumers with small claims by imposing 
72. Id. at 881. The authors further explained their methodology:
 Contracts filed by the companies we studied included stock purchase agreements; credit 
and security agreements; loan pooling and service agreements; employment agreements; 
and various agreements relating to benefits and incentives for key employees. Given the 
economic significance of these contracts—implied by their inclusion in Forms 8-K and 
10-K—we assume that they were negotiated with care.
 Id.
73. Id. at 878. The authors explained their core hypothesis as follows:
 [T]he companies we studied, or organizations to which they belong, have publicly 
endorsed the virtues of arbitration, particularly in the context of challenges to pre-
dispute arbitration clauses and related class action waivers in consumer agreements. 
arbitration . . . “takes less time and costs less than litigation;” it is “fair and effective;” 
and it offers “a quick, cheap, and easy dispute resolution mechanism” that is “more 
efficient” than resolving disputes through litigation. Based on these assertions, we 
would expect that companies would consistently contract for dispute resolution through 
arbitration.
 Id. (internal footnotes omitted).
74. Id. at 883.
75. Id. at 895 (“[C]orporations’ selective use of arbitration clauses against consumers, but not against each 
other, suggests that their use of mandatory arbitration clauses may be based more on strategic advantage 
than on a belief that corporations are better serving their customers.”).
76. Id. at 894–95.
77. For a good sampling of this literature, see Eisenberg, supra note 71, at 872 n.1. while Public Citizen 
advocates on behalf of consumers, there are a number of studies that have been paid for by associations 
that support the business community. See, e.g., u.S. Chamber Institute of legal reform, arbitration: 
Simpler, Faster, Cheaper than litigation (april 2005), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.
org/get_ilr_doc.php?docId=489; Ernst & Young llP, outcomes of arbitration: an Empirical Study of 
Consumer lending Cases (2004), available at www.ard-forum.com/rcontrol/documents/researchStudi
esndStatistics/2005ErnstandYoung.pdf.
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unfavorable terms that limit consumer f lexibility, while at the same time creating 
cost efficiencies that are rarely passed along to the consumer.78
 Digging deeper, it turns out that these studies don’t necessarily provide a complete 
picture because they don’t provide context. For example, the Public Citizen 
observations rely on the so called win-rate argument; the higher the win rate for any 
party who is a repeat player over parties that are one-time players, the more unfair 
the process is presumed to be.79 win-rate statistics in and of themselves aren’t a 
complete picture unless the data set is controlled80 for factors such as settlements,81 
conditions leading to settlements, participation of counsel representing a respondent,82 
internal filters that resolve meritorious cases while referring all others to arbitration,83 
and training of the arbitrator.84 In other words, the 94% win rate in favor of credit 
card issuers reveals only that 94% of the time the credit card issuer prevailed—it 
looks no deeper to any empirical evidence as to the factors and circumstances 
surrounding each such victory.
 The Public Citizen study, showing that NaF-appointed arbitrators ruled in favor 
of the credit card issuer 94% of the time,85 neglects to point out a crucial fact: These 
rulings involved situations in which the consumer not only defaulted in repaying the 
debt, but also failed to contest the merits of the claim being asserted by the credit 
card issuer. In other words, the Public Citizen study overlooked the nature of the 
78. with respect to the claim that cost efficiencies are rarely passed along to the consumer, Professor 
rutledge notes:
 recall that the theoretical model suggested that the savings generated from arbitration 
would be passed onto consumers, employees, and investors depending on the elasticity 
of demand for products, labor, and capital. as with the literature on cost savings, there 
appears to be no systematic study on the distributive effect of commercial arbitration. 
 rutledge, supra note 20, at 579.
79. See Hill, supra note 41, at 816–18. Evidence that there is a per se repeater effect in employment matters 
is scant to non-existent. Id. This appears to be the case as well in commercial arbitration under the 
auspices of the aaa. See Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 32, at 3.
80. See Colvin, supra note 32, at 412–19.
81. See David Sherwyn, Samuel Estreicher & Michael Heise, Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: 
A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 Stan. l. rev. 1557, 1567–68 (2005).
82. Hill, supra note 41, at 819–20.
83. weidemaier, supra note 44, at 848–54; Sherwyn et al., supra note 81, at 1566–67.
84. Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & adam C. Pritchard, Attorneys as Arbitrators 8, (univ. of Mich. law Sch. 
law & Econ., olin working Paper No. 09-001, 2009 N.Y.u. law Sch. law & Econ., research Paper 
No. 08-18, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1086372.
85. The 94% win rate is in keeping with win rates in cases processed through the court systems. See David 
Caplovitz, Consumers in Trouble: a Study of Debtors in Default 221 (1974); John a. Goerdt, 
Small Claims and Traffic Courts: Case Management, Procedures, Case Characteristics, 
and outcomes in 12 urban Jurisdictions 53 (1992); Hillard M. Sterling & Philip G. Schrag, 
Default Judgments Against Consumers: Has the System Failed?, 67 Denv. u. l. rev. 357, 384–85 (1990). 
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evidence before the arbitrator86 that showed, that as a practical matter, there was no 
alternative to awards favoring the credit card issuer.87
 arbitrators can easily be put into a position where they have no choice but to rule 
against a credit card user, even if there has been appearance by the respondent. For 
example, in the case of NaF, claims for less than $75,000 (a category into which 
most credit card claims fall)88 are often resolved at document hearings, i.e., hearings 
in which the parties submit only written statements and other documentary 
evidence.89 Mere denials of liability, unsupported by evidence of credit card theft, 
fraudulent use, identity theft, or improper accounting and bookkeeping, are 
insufficient to overcome a documented claim that the credit card was properly used 
and that a debt was actually incurred. Thus, the mere appearance of the respondent, 
without valid grounds for the denial of liability, leaves the arbitrator with no 
reasonable choice but to issue an award favoring the claimant (credit card issuer). 
This should not be a surprise. Moreover, it is unlikely, if not impossible, to imagine 
that the outcome of these cases might differ if considered by a court. The only 
difference is that the arbitration process is faster and more efficient.
 Consider the details of the usage rate study comparing consumer and non-
consumer contracts conducted by Eisenberg et al. described above. 90 That study 
failed to take into account the unique nature of each agreement that did not have an 
86. Nat’l arbitration Forum, Code of Procedure, rule 36, at 31–2 (2008), available at http://www.
adrforum.com/main.aspx?itemID=330&hideBar=False&navID=357&news=3 (arbitrators are permitted 
to enter an award in a case where the respondent defaults, but rule 36 (B) requires that the award must 
still be based on a review by the arbitrator of the merits of the claim). Compare am. arbitration 
ass’n., Commercial arbitration rules and Mediation Procedures, rule 29, at 14 (2009), 
available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440&printable=true (requiring the party who is present to 
submit such evidence as the arbitrator may require for making an award), with JaMS Comprehensive 
arbitration rules and Procedures, rule 22(j) (2009), available at http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-
comprehensive-arbitration/ (setting forth that the arbitrator may not render awards solely on the basis of 
the default of the party. The arbitrator shall require any party seeking relief to submit evidence that the 
arbitrator may require). 
87. See Sarah r. Cole & Theodore H. Frank, The Current State of Consumer Arbitration, 15 Disp. resol. 
Mag. 30, 31 (2008). 
 In a collections case, the consumer is the defendant. Typically, there is no question that 
the consumer owes the debt to the credit card issuer. . . . In arbitration . . . the debtor 
will lose, because he owes the debt. In such situations, all an arbitrator can do is enter 
an award against the debtor. Thus, the win-loss record for consumers in these cases is 
not cause for concern.
 Id; see also Yvonne w. rosmarin, Consumers-R-Us: A Reality in the U.C.C. Article 2 Revision Process, 35 
wm. & Mary l. rev. 1593, 1625–26 (1994); Budnitz, supra note 56, at 309–10; Dwight Golann, 
Developments in Consumer Financial Services Litigation, 43 Bus. law 1081, 1092 (1988).
88. See ware, supra note 13, at 97–98.
89. any party may demand a participatory hearing in which case a document hearing is heard as part of the 
participatory hearing. Nat’l arbitration Forum, Code of Procedure, rules 15 (D), 25, 28, at 15, 
23, 26 (2007), available at http://www.adrforum.com/users/naf/resources/20070801CodeofProcedure.
pdf.
90. Eisenberg, et al., supra note 71.
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arbitration clause.91 It turns out that these were stock purchase agreements, credit 
and security agreements, and loan pooling and service agreements that came about 
through negotiations in which there was a free f low of information between the 
parties. These arrangements were negotiated with the advice of attorneys—and 
perhaps more importantly, independent accountants—and performance was subject 
to review by accountants.92 asymmetrically held information played no role, and 
thus there was no need for a mechanism to modulate against its drawbacks. 
Interestingly, in situations involving negotiated employment agreements, arbitration 
clauses appeared with regularity. 93
91. Compare this study with Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An 
Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publically Held Companies, 56 DePaul l. 
rev. 335 (2007). 
92. The authors provide no information as to the circumstances of the parties to these agreements. See 
Eisenberg et al., supra note 71. Those that are publically listed on the various stock exchanges are 
subject to ongoing disclosure obligations with their information being freely and readily available.
93. The findings are consistent with those reported by Stewart J. Schwab & randall S. Thomas, An 
Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 wash. & 
lee l. rev. 231 (2006). They observe:
 Both parties to a CEo employment contract frequently view arbitration clauses as 
desirable. Companies universally want to arbitrate disputes to keep matters private, and 
thereby avoid adverse publicity over a messy termination and possible public litigation. 
Normally, employees would want to preserve their right to a jury trial (but for the 
greater expense) because they calculate that a jury of their peers would be more 
sympathetic to their situation than to the company firing them. However, CEos may 
have good reason to believe that juries will not identify with their compensation 
demands because the amounts involved may seem excessive to most members of the 
public. This may lead executives to favor arbitration generally, although they will still 
carefully negotiate such things as the selection process for the arbitrators and their right 
to appeal from an adverse decision. 
 Id. at 238. Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey Miller conclude:
 Table 2 reports the number and percentage of contracts that contain arbitration clauses. 
The overwhelming majority, about 89%, do not mandate arbitration. whatever 
arbitration’s supposed efficiencies, sophisticated actors are not f locking to it in a broad 
range of important contracts. Some contract types—pooling and servicing agreements 
and trust agreements—never provided for arbitration. others—bond indentures, 
underwriting agreements, and security agreements—almost never did. But material 
variation exists across contract types. For example, 37% of employment contracts and 
33% of licensing agreements provided for arbitration. Clearly, the nature of the contract 
is associated with whether the parties agree ex ante to arbitrate.
 The results support the view, expressed by corporate lawyers, that the decision to 
include an arbitration provision in a commercial contract is complex and cannot be 
determined across the board. The infrequency of arbitration clauses across the entire 
range of categories also suggests that sophisticated contracting parties may not, in fact, 
believe in the purported benefits of arbitration over litigation.
 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 92, at 350 (internal footnotes omitted).
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  3. The sampling of attitudes
 other empirical academic studies suggest that evidence is accumulating pointing 
to the conclusion that arbitration is fair.94
 Sherwyn et al., in 2005, looked at the full history of a claim from initial filing to 
resolution. The data the researchers reviewed gave them confidence in the fairness of 
employment arbitration.95 The study concluded “that plaintiffs do not fare significantly 
better in litigation, that arbitration provides a quicker resolution than litigation, and 
that available data do not indicate whether damages are fairer under either 
system.”96
 Similarly, Elizabeth Hill, in a study of 200 employee dispute awards handed 
down by aaa arbitrators in 1999 and 2000, concluded that objections to arbitration 
were without empirical foundation.97 Hill’s study focused on claims by middle and 
lower income groups. She found that employment arbitration “is the primary venue” 
for claims by middle- and lower-income employees in large measure because of the 
94. See Sherwyn et al., supra note 81, at 1568–69, 1572–73, 1575, 1578; Hill, supra note 41, at 784, 807–08, 
818–24. For a detailed discussion of analysis based on win-loss rates, repeat player bias, disposition time 
and damages, see Sherwyn et al., supra note 81, at 1567–78.
95. Sherwyn et al., supra note 81, at 1578.
 as with much empirical work, it is possible to critique and discount prior research. 
Still, despite the f laws, there are some conclusions about which we can be confident 
regarding the “fairness” of arbitration. First, there is no evidence that plaintiffs fare 
significantly better in litigation. In fact, the opposite may be true. Second, arbitration is 
faster. Because employment dispute resolution can be both heart wrenching and 
financially crippling, a quicker resolution is a positive. Third, the question of damages 
is too difficult to determine based on available data. while the strongest consensus 
exists with respect to disposition time, further research is warranted on all three factors, 
especially on the questions of win/loss records and damages. of course, even more and 
better data are unlikely to provide definitive answers to all empirical questions. 
Moreover, data will not answer the critical nonempirical questions that greatly inf luence 
the debate
 Id.
96. Id. at 1564. See also Maltby, supra note 34, at 117–18 (“The data currently available shows that the 
results of quality employment arbitration compare well to the results of employment litigation. . . . The 
only negative for employees who arbitrate their employment disputes may be that extremely large awards 
are less common in arbitration.”).
97. Hill, supra note 41, at 824.
 opposition to employer-sponsored employment arbitration is widespread, strong, and 
based on the belief that it robs employees of the right to trial and supplants it with a 
“kangaroo court” dominated by employers’ interests. In contrast, research shows that 
middle- and lower-income employees and employees who arbitrated pursuant to 
promulgated agreements had no real, practical right to trial. This study indicates that 
aaa employment arbitration offers affordable, substantial, measurable due process to 
employees arbitrating pursuant to mandatory arbitration agreements and to middle- 
and lower-income employees.
 Id.
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inability of these claimants to obtain legal assistance on a contingent fee basis.98 Hill 
concluded that there was no support for claims that:
•	 	Employment	arbitration	cannot	competently	resolve	statutory	employment	
discrimination claims;
•	 	Employer-sponsored	arbitration	is	biased	in	favor	of	highly-compensated	
employees;
•	 	Employer-sponsored	arbitration	is	biased	in	favor	of	employers;	and
•	 	The	“repeat	player	effect”	is	a	failure	of	due	process.99
98. Hill, supra note 41, at 784. others have reached the same conclusion. See John J. Donohue III & Peter 
Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 Stan. l. rev. 983 (1991); 
william M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination: What Really Does Happen? Disp. 
resol. J., oct.–Dec. 1995, at 40; lewis l. Maltby, Out of the Frying Pan, into the Fire: The Feasibility of 
Post-Dispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 30 wm. Mitchell l. rev. 313 (2003). See also 
weidemaier, supra note 44, at 855–56 (2008); Sherwyn et al., supra note 81, at 99–100.
99. Hill, supra note 41, at 784.
 [T]his study evaluates, and tends to refute, the beliefs that: (1) employment arbitration 
cannot competently resolve statutory employment discrimination claims; (2) employer-
sponsored arbitration is biased in favor of highly-compensated employees; and (3) 
employer- sponsored arbitration is biased in favor of employers.
 Indeed, the data here do not even support the theory that the “repeat player effect” is a 
failure of due process. The “repeat player effect” is the only empirically proven theory of 
alleged failure of due process in employment arbitration. The empirically proven fact 
upon which the theory is based is that employers who arbitrate frequently win 
arbitrations more often tha[n] those that arbitrate only once.
 Id. (internal footnotes omitted). Professor rutledge adds: 
 one oft-stated concern about arbitration is that it systematically favors repeat players. 
according to the argument, many arbitrations such as in the fields currently under 
consideration by Congress involve participation by one party who regularly arbitrates—
the employer, the company, the franchisor—and one who rarely does so—the employee, 
the consumer, the franchisee. Because the former party in each case is a repeat player, 
critics argue that this will skew the results in favor of that party’s advantage.
  why might repeat players do well in arbitration? one reason might be that the 
repeat player may have superior knowledge about the arbitral process and, therefore, 
may be able to exploit that informational asymmetry to its advantage. The validity of 
that proposition, however, is not unique to arbitration. rather, it would be equally valid 
in any other dispute-resolution forum, including litigation. The employer, the 
corporation, or the franchisor would appear in the forum more frequently and, therefore, 
could have superior knowledge about the forum’s operations. Thus, to the extent 
informational asymmetries explain the repeat player’s success in arbitration, eliminating 
arbitration does not correct the asymmetries.
  another reason for the repeat player’s success might be the financial incentives of 
arbitrators. The argument would go that arbitrators, unlike judges, depend on repeat 
business to generate a stream of income and, therefore, have an incentive to render 
awards favoring the party more likely to appoint them in the future. unlike the 
informational-asymmetry explanation, this reason is indeed unique to arbitration.
 rutledge, supra note 20, at 565 (internal footnotes omitted).
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 while these studies indicate that arbitration as an alternative to litigation is fair, 
other studies indicate that at least some people are not convinced that mandatory 
arbitration is all that desirable. richey et al.100 studied a sample of potential job 
applicants and found that while non-binding arbitration was not seen as an 
impediment to applying for work, mandatory arbitration was viewed less favorably 
and was considered as a negative factor in the decision to apply for a job.101 Similarly, 
Mahony et al. found that employees favored employers who offered voluntary 
arbitration as a method for resolving employment-related disputes. 102 Together these 
studies imply that at least among potential employees, control over the choice to 
arbitrate or go to court hinges on the question of ultimate control. This is a finding 
that is consistent with the findings of Black and Gross, discussed in the next section.
 There may be some empirical evidence to support this skepticism. a series of 
studies suggest a significantly lower success rate for employment cases arbitrated by 
the Financial Industry regulating authority (FINra).103 The combined results of 
these studies showed an employee success rate of only 43%. while there is much 
speculation about why these rates differ from those reported in cases administered by 
the aaa, the best explanation appears to be that the types of cases involved were 
simply not comparable. The FINra cases were exclusively statutory civil rights 
cases, whereas the aaa cases were exclusively contract cases.104
 what about the preferences of employees who earn large sums? The arbitration 
Fairness act of 2009 would render a pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreement 
between a sophisticated CEo and his/her corporation unenforceable, an outcome 
that would be unquestionably unfair if there is empirical evidence that CEos have a 
preference for mandatory arbitration. Stewart J. Schwab and randall S. Thomas 
conducted a usage-rate study of 375 employment contracts for chief executive officers 
of some of the largest u.S. publicly held corporations. The study found that 41.6% of 
the time (156 contracts), arbitration was the preferred vehicle for dispute resolution.105 
This finding casts doubt on the assertion that mandatory arbitration clauses come 
about because a coercive employer seeks to take advantage of an employee with little 
100. Brenda richey, H. John Bernardin, Catherine l. Tyler & Nancy McKinney, The Effect of Arbitration 
Program Characteristics on Applicants’ Intentions Toward Potential Employers, 86 J. applied Psychol. 
1006, 1009 (2001).
101. Id. at 1009.
102. Douglas M. Mahony, Brian S. Klaas, John a. McClendon & arup Varma, The Effects of Mandatory 
Employment Arbitration Systems on Applicants’ Attraction to Organizations, 44 Hum. resource Mgmt. 
449, 458–59 (2004). 
103. In one study, the sample consisted of 62 cases with employees winning only 36% (twenty-two cases) of 
the time. Stuart H. Bompey & andrea H. Stempel, Four Years Later: A Look at Compulsory Arbitration of 
Employment Discrimination Claims after Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson lane Corp., 21 Emp. rel. l.J. 21, 
37–43 (1995). In another, the sample was 572 cases and the win rate was 44%. Michael Delikat & 
Morris M. Kleiner, Comparing Litigation and Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Do Plaintiffs Better 
Vindicate Their Rights in Litigation?, 6 a.B.a. Sec. Conf. Mgmt. 1 (2003).
104. See Maltby, supra note 34, at 100–11. See also weidemaier, supra note 44, at 847–56.
105. Schwab & Thomas, supra note 93, at 257.
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bargaining power.106 The authors note that the reason for this attraction to arbitration 
may result from a concern that, to juries, a CEo’s compensation demand might have 
a decidedly hollow ring. 107
  4. Studies About Third Party Rules Mandating Arbitration
 a series of recent studies looking at arbitration within the context of securities 
cases focused not only on win rates, but also on the perceptions of participants in 
mandatory arbitration proceedings. These studies involved disputes between 
customers/investors and brokers. The forum administering these proceedings was 
FINra, a self-regulating industry organization.108 The panels hearing cases are 
composed of three individuals, one of whom must be affiliated with the securities 
industry.
 Beginning with the issue of win rates, these studies show that since 1998, 
customer win rates have been steadily declining, especially if the respondent was a 
larger brokerage firm. In addition, awards as a percentage of the amounts being 
claimed have also declined.109 against this backdrop, Barbara Black and Jill Gross 
106. Id. at 238.
 Both parties to a CEo employment contract frequently view arbitration clauses as desirable. 
Companies universally want to arbitrate disputes to keep matters private, and thereby avoid 
adverse publicity over a messy termination and possible public litigation. Normally, 
employees would want to preserve their right to a jury trial (but for the greater expense) 
because they calculate that a jury of their peers would be more sympathetic to their situation 
than to the company firing them. However, CEos may have good reason to believe that 
juries will not identify with their compensation demands because the amounts involved may 
seem excessive to most members of the public. This may lead executives to favor arbitration 
generally, although they will still carefully negotiate such things as the selection process for 
the arbitrators and their right to appeal from an adverse decision.
 Id. 
107. Id.
108. FINra was organized in the summer of 2007. It is composed, on a consolidated basis, of what was 
previously the National association of Securities Dealers (“NaSD”) and the New York Stock Exchange 
(“NYSE”) arbitration forums. For purposes of this article, all references to FINra include references to 
the NaSD and the NYSE. about the Financial Industry regulatory authority, http://www.finra.org/
aboutFINra/index.htm (last visited oct. 4, 2009).
109. Edward S. o’Neal & Daniel r. Solin, Mandatory arbitration of Securities Disputes: a Statistical 
analysis of How Claimants Fair (2007) available at http://smartestinvestmentbook.com/pdf/061307%20
Securities%20arbitration%20outcome%20report%20FINal.pdf.
 There may well be innocent explanations for fact that the chances of an investor 
recovering significant damages from a major brokerage firm are statistically small in 
mandatory arbitration. However, our data clearly indicates a decline in both the overall 
“win” rate and the expected recovery percentage against major brokerage firms, at a 
time when the misconduct of these firms reached its apex with the analyst fraud 
scandal. 
 This data gives credence to Commissioner Galvin’s testimony about the system really 
being a “… damage containment and control program masquerading as a juridical 
proceeding”, intended to protect the major brokerage firms from significant damages. 
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undertook a study of the perceptions of fairness for participants in the securities 
arbitration system.110 Their study picks up where a prior study, called the Perino 
report,111 left off. The Perino report found that “there is little if any indication that 
undisclosed conflicts represent a significant problem in [self regulatory organization 
(“Sro”)]-sponsored arbitrations. available empirical evidence suggests that Sro 
arbitrations are fair and that investors perceive them to be fair.”112
 In comparison, Black and Gross found that while participants believed they were 
given a procedurally appropriate hearing, attitudes were mixed when it came to the 
performance of the panel in reaching an impartial award.113 These findings appear to 
whether for good reason or otherwise, the mandatory arbitration system is achieving 
this result.
 Id. at 17.
110. See Black & Gross, supra note 61.
111. Michael Perino, report to the Securities and Exchange Commission regarding arbitrator 
Conflict Disclosure requirements in NaSD and NYSE Securities arbitrations 1 (2002), 
http://www.sec.gov/pdf/arbconflict.pdf.
112. Id. at 48. The Perino report followed a report by Gary Tidwell, Kevin Foster & Michael Hummel, 
Party Evaluation of arbitrators: an analysis of Data Collected from NaSD regulation 
arbitrations 3 (1999), http://www.finra.org/web/groups/arbitrationmediation/@arbmed/@neutrl/
documents/arbmed/p009528.pdf. 
113. Black & Gross, supra note 61, at 3. according to their survey:
 [P]articipants [had] divided views about the fairness of securities arbitration, based on 
their most recent experience with the process. In general, when asked to focus on their 
most recent dispute filed for arbitration, participants overwhelmingly agreed that the 
arbitration panel listened to the parties, their representatives and the witnesses and gave 
the parties enough time to present their evidence and argue the merits of their cases. 
Participants also perceived that the arbitrators appeared competent to handle the 
dispute, to resolve pre-hearing issues, and to understand the issues and legal arguments 
in the case. They also believed that the discovery process allowed them to obtain the 
necessary information for a hearing.
 In contrast, participants’ perceptions as to other aspects of the panel’s performance in 
their most recent dispute were more mixed; in particular, whether the panel was open-
minded and impartial and whether the panel applied the law. Views were also divided 
on whether the hearings took too long and whether the arbitration process was too 
expensive. Survey participants were divided about whether they would recommend that 
others use arbitration to resolve their securities disputes; whether they had a favorable 
view of securities arbitration; and whether the outcome was very different from their 
initial expectations.
 Furthermore, overall, participants were not satisfied with the outcome of their most 
recent dispute and would be more satisfied if they had an explanation of the award. 
Many survey participants with recent comparable experience in a civil court case 
perceived arbitration as unfair by comparison.
 Finally, when asked about their overall perception of securities arbitration (as opposed 
to their perceptions derived from their most recent experience), survey participants 
were more negative. although participants agreed that arbitration is conducted in a 
simple way, they were split as to whether the process is economical, and they disagreed 
with the statements that it is conducted without bias and conducted in a way that is fair 
to all parties.
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be at odds with the long-held belief among some scholars that perceptions of 
procedural fairness impact perceptions of substantive fairness, and account for a 
greater willingness to accept the outcome, even if it isn’t favorable.114 However, 
perceptions of procedural fairness are rooted in concerns about an ability to control 
the dispute resolution process,115 with an emphasis on the advancement of self-
interests.116 Black and Gross found that 79.3% of the respondents believed that their 
customer agreement contained a pre-dispute arbitration clause117 and that 56.2% of 
participants believed they had no choice but to have their dispute resolved in 
arbitration.118 Moreover, they also found that nearly 40% of the respondents were 
concerned that the process would not be fair going in.119 Taken together, these 
findings seem to suggest that the respondents did not believe strongly that they were 
able to control the dispute resolution process. This conclusion is confirmed by a 
further finding that 55.48% of the customers sampled and 43.79% of all others 
sampled said they would have been more satisfied if they had been provided with an 
explanation of the final award.120
 For almost every question in the survey, statistical analysis reveals that customers have 
a more negative perception of the process than non-customers.
 Id.
114. Id. at 6–7.
 Dispute resolution scholars recently have focused on procedural justice as a more reliable 
predictor than substantive justice with respect to parties’ assessment of the overall 
fairness of a process. These scholars have found that perceptions of procedural fairness 
strongly impact perceptions of substantive fairness, which results in a greater willingness 
to comply with the outcome and greater trust in and respect for the decision-maker. 
Summarizing prior research by social psychologists, a leading scholar of procedural 
justice writes that “people who believe that they have been treated in a procedurally fair 
manner are more likely to conclude that the resulting outcome is substantively fair, even 
if that outcome is unfavorable.” She posits that four key elements “reliably lead people to 
conclude that a dispute resolution process is procedurally fair:” (1) the process provides 
an opportunity for disputants to voice their concerns to a third party; (2) the disputants 
perceive that the third party actually considered these concerns; (3) the disputants 
perceive that the third party treated them in an “even-handed” way; and (4) the 
disputants feel that they were treated in a dignified and respectful manner.
 Id. (internal footnotes omitted). See also Nancy a. welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: 
What’s Justice Got to With It?, 79 wash. u. l. Q. 787, 817–30 (2001). See generally Tom r. Tyler, why 
People obey the law (2006); Donna Shestowsky, Procedural Preferences in Alternate Dispute Resolution: 
A Closer, Modern Look at an Old Idea, 10 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & l. 211 (2004). 
115. See Shestowsky, supra note 114, at 225–27.
116. Donna Shestowsky, Misjudging: Implications for Dispute Resolution, 7 Nev. l.J. 487 (2007).
117. Black & Gross, supra note 61, at 19.
118. Id. at 20 n.49.
119. Id. at 21.
120. Id. at 39.
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 Studies comparing actual win rates in litigation to actual win rates in arbitration, 
sometimes called “macro justice” studies,121 suggest a bias in favor of arbitration. 
Delikat and Kleiner looked at 125 employment discrimination cases tried in the 
Southern District of New York122 and compared the results to 186 such cases resolved 
by arbitrators in proceedings facilitated by NaSD/NYSE. The study suggests that 
while the win rates in arbitration exceed those realized in the courthouse, the 
amounts (on average) awarded by arbitrators were significantly lower than the 
amounts awarded in court.
 This study and others like it are not without f laws. Cases resolved through 
arbitration and litigation often aren’t comparable because of the screening techniques 
used in the selection and assignment process and because of settlement.123 
121. See lisa B. Bingham, Tina Nabatchi, Jeffrey M. Sanger & Michael S. Jackman, Dispute Resolution and 
the Vanishing Trial: Comparing Federal Government Litigation and ADR Outcomes 32 (3rd annual 
Converence on Empirical legal Studies Papers, 2008), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=1127878. 
“Macrojustice involves issues about the ‘fairness’ of dispute resolution processes, and specifically about 
whether a particular dispute resolution process favors one side or the other.” Id.
122. Michael Delikat & Morris M. Kleiner, An Empirical Study of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Where Do 
Plaintiffs Better Vindicate Their Rights?, 58 J. Disp. resol. 56, 56–58 (2003). Comparing to the Southern 
District of New York, the findings were:
     SDNY  arBITraTIoN
Plaintiffs prevail   33.6%   46.2%
Media judgment/award   $95,554  $100,000
average judgment/award   $377,030  $236,292
Media attorney fee judgment award $69,338  $76,684
average attorney fee judgment/award $149,756  $36,282
Media time to resolution   25 months  16.5 months
 Id.
123. See Sherwyn, supra note 81, at 1564–65. Sherwyn et al. note:
 To answer the question of whether arbitration is fair to employees, researchers typically 
compare the results of cases adjudicated in arbitration against those adjudicated in 
litigation. Specifically, win/loss rates and monetary awards are compared across the 
two systems. There is, of course, a problem with this type of analysis: the stream of 
litigated and arbitrated cases differs. Consequently, one can never be sure if the reason 
for a disparity in outcomes, if any, involves the adjudication system or some other factor, 
such as the strength of the case, or perhaps a selection factor determining which cases 
go to court and which cases end up in arbitration.
 Id. See also Bingham et al., supra note 121, at 35. 
 Macrojustice debates about aDr and litigation have addressed issues of both monetary 
relief requested and monetary relief granted. Some have speculated that plaintiffs do 
better in aDr than in litigation, because plaintiffs who settle a case sidestep the 
possibility of having a judge dismiss the lawsuit entirely (dismissal occurs in a significant 
number of litigated cases). on the other hand, some believe that plaintiffs may do worse 
in aDr than in litigation, because they may settle for less than their case is worth out 
of fear that they will recover nothing if a jury finds in favor of the defendant. Thus, 
determining whether there are differences between aDr and litigation cases in the 
amount of relief granted is an important macrojustice issue, especially when viewed 
from a public policy perspective.
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  5. Other studies
 If mandatory arbitration is “unfair,” one would expect to find a decrease in the 
use of arbitration clauses. But Professors Drahazol and wittlock have found that at 
least in the case of franchise agreements, this is apparently not the case. They 
compared usage rates for a group of franchisors in 1999 to 2007. They found: (1) 
there was little change in the use of arbitration clauses by franchisors, (2) there was 
little to indicate that franchisees were attempting to avoid arbitration clauses, and (3) 
few if any of the clauses reviewed were modified in response to the possibility of a 
risk that courts would invalidate the clauses based on unconscionability.124
 and finally, while not necessarily the most objective participants in the process, 
an american Bar association survey found that 78% who were surveyed believed the 
arbitration process itself to be as effective, if not more so, than traditional 
litigation.125
 To sum up, it is a mistake to dismiss the claims about the practical benefits in 
arbitration. Empirical evidence suggests that general and mandatory arbitration 
 Id.
124. Drahozal & wittrock, supra note 7, at 5–6. 
 we find that, in the aggregate, there has been little change in the use of arbitration 
clauses in the franchise agreements studied. The proportion of franchise agreements 
with arbitration clauses is essentially the same in 2007 (43.7%) as it was in 1999 (45.1%). 
Viewed individually, there has been some reshuff ling among franchisors as to their 
chosen means of dispute resolution. Four franchisors (out of 32, or 12.5%) replaced 
arbitration clauses in their franchise agreements with exclusive forum selection clauses, 
which was largely offset by three franchisors adding arbitration clauses to their franchise 
agreements (which previously had contained no dispute resolution clause at all). This 
reshuff ling of franchisors may provide at least a partial explanation for the anecdotal 
reports of f light.
 we also find little indication that franchisees are f leeing arbitration by avoiding 
franchisors that include arbitration clauses in their arbitration agreements. The number 
of franchised locations for franchisors in the sample that use arbitration clauses 
increased from 57,397 in 2000 to 75,874 in 2006. The share of those franchised 
locations as a percentage of the total likewise increased, from 43.7% in 2000 to 46.3% 
in 2006. These numbers provide no evidence that franchisees avoid franchisors that use 
arbitration.
 Finally, most changes to the terms of arbitration clauses studied were relatively minor, 
although some are worth noting. The use of class arbitration waivers increased 
substantially (from 50 percent to over 80 percent of the clauses). Notably, three (of 28, 
or 10.7%) of those class arbitration waivers included “non–severability” provisions under 
which, if a court holds the 6 class arbitration waiver invalid, the entire arbitration clause 
is invalidated. Given that a number of jurisdictions have held class arbitration waivers 
to be unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable, these non–severability provisions 
result in what might be characterized as a partial but small f light from arbitration. The 
use of common carve-outs (i.e., exceptions to arbitration) also increased slightly, again 
indicating a partial f light from arbitration, albeit only for those types of disputes or 
remedies excluded from the obligation to arbitrate.
 Id.
125. See lawrence r. Mills, You Can Get What You Need in Arbitration, 2008 a.B.a. Sec. on lit. Conf. 
Mgmt. 10.
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within the context of agreements made by the targeted group are fair. as we have 
seen, even when assessed using one or more of many variables, arbitration remains a 
practical and useful solution for the disposition of disputes arising in the commercial 
arena. Further, there is no empirical evidence that suggests that mandatory arbitration 
is an unfair or inappropriate solution to the pernicious effect of asymmetrically held 
information. 
 From here, the debate moves to public policy and the alleged need to reform our 
system for using arbitration. what follows in the next part is a look at that debate 
and the consequences of efforts to regulate or ban the enforcement of pre-dispute 
mandatory arbitration. 
IV. PUBLIC POLICY: THE DEADLOCK
 as we have seen, the current effort by those who oppose mandatory arbitration is 
aimed at federal legislation banning the enforcement of any pre-dispute arbitration 
found in contracts for (1) consumer transactions, (2) franchise agreements, (3) 
employment agreements, and (4) disputes arising under any statute intended to 
protect civil rights.126 If passed, such legislation would apply to all targeted agreements, 
no matter when made.127 Professor rutledge characterizes this as a “ jackhammer 
approach to arbitration reform.”128 Blunderbuss is another way to describe the effort. 
The proposed statutory scheme makes no effort to regulate or control the use of 
particular terms and conditions in arbitration clauses claimed to be offensive, such as 
terms restricting application of law, class action waivers, damages, discovery, and 
jury trials. Supporters of banning arbitration maintain that regulation is impractical 
and unrealistic because no matter how sophisticated the regulatory scheme, those 
favoring arbitration will always find a way to circumvent regulation.129 The proposed 
legislation is absolute; pre-dispute arbitration clauses would be simply outlawed. The 
consequences of this legislation would be stark, as it would kill off most arbitration 
between individuals and corporations, partnerships, and all governmental agencies. 
In some instances, employment being an example, even two sophisticated parties—
i.e., a C.E.o. and his/her employer—would be denied the ability to agree on a 
predispute arbitration clause because the arbitration Fairness act of 2009, as written, 
126. The arbitration Fairness act of 2009, H.r. 1020, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009). 
127. Peter rutledge, Who Can Be Against Fairness? The Case Against the Arbitration Fairness Act, 9 Cardozo 
J. Conflict resol. 267, 268–69 (2008) (discussing the version of the arbitration Fairness act that was 
considered by the 110th Congress, S. 1782, H.r. 3010, (2007)). The only substantive difference between 
the 2007 and 2009 legislation is that the prior proposes “transactions between parties of unequal 
bargaining power” in the target group. arbitration Fairness act, S. 1782, H.r. 3010, 110th Congress § 4 
(2007) 
128. rutledge, supra note 127, at 269.
129. See Jean r. Sternlight, Dispute Resolution and the Quest for Justice, 14 Disp. resol. Mag. 12 (2008) 
(“regulation is not sufficient because no legislature can ever think creatively or broadly enough to 
proscribe every practice that a company might impose, and litigation challenges are too costly and time-
consuming to offer adequate protection from unfair arbitration provisions.”).
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applies to all employment agreements.130 It would also foist on civil courts millions, 
if not tens of millions, of new cases that would further clog an already overburdened 
and underfunded system.
 Those favoring the arbitration process believe that they shouldn’t be summarily 
and absolutely denied the basic benefits that arbitration offers, i.e., efficiency and 
speed. They urge that their opponents’ concerns about access to justice have already 
been addressed since many providers of arbitration services have adopted protocols 
designed to insure fairness and due process. Supporters of arbitration also dismiss as 
unworkable and unrealistic the suggestion that those that they do business with will 
readily agree to arbitration after a dispute arises.131 They note that, with few 
exceptions, pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses are rarely found by courts to be 
unconscionable.132 The proponents of arbitration conclude that it is unfair to deny 
them access to a system that they believe best serves their needs.
 The result is what appears to be a classic deadlock between antagonists completely 
unwilling to accommodate one another. Does this deadlock need to be broken? I 
130. See text of arbitration Fairness act of 2009, supra note 9.
131. Developments in the Law: Access to Courts, 122 Harv. l. rev. 1151, 1177 (2009).
 achieving cost efficiencies requires that parties already be bound to arbitrate before a 
conf lict arises, and this is precisely the type of arbitration agreement that the aFa 
would void. The necessity of requiring arbitration pre-dispute arises for three reasons. 
First, assuming that arbitration is a cheaper way of enforcing legal rights, rational 
defendants might not want to enter into it post-dispute if they know they are likely to 
lose. Such a defendant might hope that, faced with the significantly greater costs of 
pursuing litigation, the corporate plaintiff would simply drop the claim. Second, the 
use of a loser-pays rule in some arbitrations can further amplify the disincentive for a 
defendant to accede to arbitration. Third, even if it were economically rational for the 
consumer to enter into a post-conflict arbitration agreement (perhaps if her legal fees 
were paid), the transaction cost of bargaining might itself be overly expensive, and 
given the high stakes for the individual consumer, she might be too hostile to agree to 
anything that her creditor is requesting of her. Contrariwise, if arbitration were in fact 
a cheaper and more efficient way of enforcing legal rights, a consumer entering into an 
initial contract with a creditor would have an interest in consenting to mandatory 
binding arbitration in the event of a dispute, since at least some of the benefits would 
likely be passed on to the consumer in the form of lower costs. These reasons all argue 
for allowing consumers to make a binding choice pre-dispute rather than forcing 
arbitration choices to be made after a conflict has arisen.
 Id. (internal footnotes omitted).
132. See cases, supra note 6. See also Salley v. option one Mortg. Corp., 246 Fed. appx. 87 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(applying Pennsylvania law); Desiderio v. NaSD, 191 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 1999); Deaton v. overstock.
Com, No. 07-643, 2007 u.S. Dist. lEXIS 94436 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 27, 2007); Nichols v. wash. Mut. 
Bank, No. 07-3216, 2007 u.S. Dist. lEXIS 85936 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2007); lyman v. Mor Furniture 
for less, No. 06-0666, 2007 u.S. Dist. lEXIS 58187 (D. Nev. aug. 7, 2007); Sherr v. Dell, Inc., No. 
05-10097, 2006 u.S. Dist. lEXIS 51864 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2006) (applying Texas law); Cunningham 
v. Citicorp., No. 05-3476, 2005 u.S. Dist. lEXIS 33805 (D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2005). But see Ferguson v. 
Countrywide Credit Indus., 298 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2002); luafau v. affiliated Computer Servs., No. 
06-0347, 2006 u.S. Dist lEXIS 33048 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2006); In re Poly-america, l.P., 262 
S.w.3d 337 (Tex. 2008); olson v. Bon Inc., 183 P.3d 359 (wash. Ct. app. 2008); armendariz v. 
Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
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submit that the apparent deadlock is an illusion; legislation is not called for because 
the current marketplace environment is sufficiently f lexible to accommodate the 
concerns of all the players. 
 Keeping in mind the reality that regulation can stif le constructive economic 
activity, a number of pre-conditions should be met in order for legislation banning 
arbitration to be necessary. These pre-conditions include empirically based findings 
that confirm the following:
•	  Mandatory arbitration serves no practical purpose and unfairly 
benefits the party insisting on such a clause;
•	  The practical purposes served by mandatory arbitration are 
without economic justification; 
•	  The practical purposes are at the least substantively 
unconscionable; and
•	  There is resulting direct harm to the party against whom 
mandatory arbitration is imposed.
 as we have seen, there is no empirical evidence to conclusively establish any one 
of these pre-conditions. Mandatory arbitration clauses are appropriately used by 
commercial players doing business in very competitive commercial market 
environments. adequate safeguards in the form of “protocols” are already in place to 
protect against overreaching and other forms of abuse. In addition, the courts are 
steadfast in assuring that any term thought to operate in an unconscionable manner 
will be reviewed and if appropriate, struck as invalid. For the providers included in 
the targeted group, survival is contingent on how they position themselves relative to 
those against whom they must compete. all participants in our commercial system 
have and should continue to enjoy the freedom to accommodate completive forces by 
promoting terms they believe are reasonable with the understanding that no 
consumer, franchisee, or employee is under any obligation to do business with them 
on their terms. In short, the existing commercial system sufficiently addresses the 
concerns of all who participate. There is no justification for legislative intervention at 
this time.
 Notice that up to now I have interchangeably used “pre-dispute mandatory 
arbitration” and “arbitration.” This is not an accident. The debate about arbitration is 
always framed in the context of the appropriateness of pre-dispute mandatory 
arbitration clauses imposed unilaterally either by contract, or in certain cases, disputes 
governed by the rules of the New York Stock Exchange, NaSD, and FINra. Doing 
so equates and debases any form of “arbitration” with the feelings of mistrust, 
apprehension, and helplessness that are associated with the imposition of “mandatory 
arbitration.” This approach creates the impression that their overall concerns about 
arbitration will be put to rest if pre-dispute clauses are banned. But if this is the case, 
they need to explain why it is that at the same time they favor “banning” legislation 
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that lumps franchise contracts together with consumer and employment agreements. 
The alleged justification is that the common denominator is an unequal bargaining 
power that serves to undermine the requirement of mutual acceptance. That argument 
may have limited validity when considering consumer contracts and certain classes of 
employment agreements, but it rings hollow with respect to franchise agreements. 
Franchise arrangements are usually entered into by relatively sophisticated business 
people who are typically represented by counsel. Moreover, state laws regulate 
franchise offerings requiring extensive disclosures and regulatory approval of anyone 
offering prospectuses or circulars. The states also grant authority to the state attorney 
general to monitor franchise activities and to seek civil and criminal sanctions when 
appropriate. Given the current levels of disclosure and regulation, there simply is no 
inherent issue of unequal bargaining. Therefore, it must be the arbitration process 
itself that is the real target, and by including franchise agreements, the end game is 
to chip away at arbitration in any kind of commercial agreement, even those where 
the unequal bargaining defect doesn’t actually exist.
 A.  The Effect of Legislation Banning Enforcement of Pre-dispute Mandatory 
Arbitration Clauses
 But suppose that Congress does pass legislation banning pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses in agreements used by the targeted group. what might be the consequences?
The most obvious consequence would be the end of arbitration’s benefits. It’s worth 
restating those benefits. arbitration promotes efficiency and speed because it:
•	  Does away with juries and the potential for high damage 
awards;
•	  Provides confidentiality and serves to shield participants from 
publicity;
•	  Insures that disputes are resolved using a nationally uniform set 
of procedures;
•	  Saves on the cost of appeals;
•	  Eliminates class action litigation;
•	  acts as a deterrent by imposing obligations to pay fees on 
claimants;
•	  reduces the costs of discovery;
•	  affords a hands on opportunity to participate in the decision 
about who will resolve a dispute;
•	  Insures dispositive decisions using commercial norms;
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•	  acts as a substitute for insurance against asymmetrically held 
information; and 
•	  assures that the consumer of credit, the franchisee, and the 
employee will have access to a forum for the airing of grievances 
because it reduces the cost of attorney fees.
 without these benefits, providers will be forced to build into their pricing the 
increase in costs that will result from the uncertainties associated with traditional 
litigation. That cost will have to be passed along directly in some form or another to 
the consumer of credit, the franchisee, and indirectly to the customers of the employer 
who previously relied on mandatory arbitration.
 Cost aside, given the unique risks for each of the agreements in the targeted 
group, providers are more likely to insist on new devices to contain the harmful 
effects that the loss of these benefits will have on the manner in which they do 
business. In the case of a consumer of credit, the likely result will be an overall 
reduction and restriction in the lending of credit to only those with a proven track 
record. This would cause a negative impact on the entirety of our commercial system 
and impairment on growth. In the end, when the implications of banning pre-dispute 
arbitration in the consumer credit arena are fully realized, it is likely that pressure 
will be brought to bear on Congress to reintroduce arbitration.
 without mandatory pre-dispute arbitration, the franchisor will be forced to 
devise new methods to protect the reputation of the franchise and the franchisor 
from the ill effects of the non-cooperating franchisee. as with consumer credit, the 
most likely course will be restrictions on the awarding of new franchises to only 
those with a proven track record and those who are willing and able to fund up front 
the financial means for development, improvements, and shared universal costs, such 
as advertising. and it is likely that these restrictions will undermine franchising as a 
business model, particularly in areas such as restaurant and hotel development and 
automobile sales. and in the end, as with consumer credit, the reduction in franchise 
availability will likely create pressure on Congress to engineer to reintroduce 
arbitration.
 For employers, the potential consequences of banning mandatory pre-dispute 
arbitration will likely be the greatest. without the ability to use arbitration as a part 
of an overall human resources strategy designed to remediate, employers are more 
likely to experience workplace strife and business interruptions. Employees are likely 
to realize that given the reality of increased employer costs associated with litigation 
and the risk of excessive jury awards, awards for punitive damages, and/or class action 
claims, it may not be in their best interest to delay the filing of a claim by 
accommodating employer preferences for an opportunity to have a human resource 
specialist try to address employee dissatisfaction. with this in mind, employers are 
likely to insist, as a condition of employment, on an employee agreeing to waive any 
potential claim for punitive damages, class action status, and to agree to some form 
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of liquidated damages in the event of a claim for wrongful termination or any form 
of discrimination.
 There will also be consequences for the judicial system. Claims that would 
otherwise be handled in arbitration will be foisted upon the courts. although the 
banning of pre-dispute arbitration is likely to be set at the federal level, the dollars 
and cents impact will be felt at the state and local level for it will be the task of the 
state and local courts to absorb the influx of the millions of new cases resulting from 
the federal mandate. with state and local budgets already insufficient to handle the 
current caseload, the inf lux of new cases will likely result in the collapse of the 
existing system, and with that, a greater disrespect for law than already exists.
 B.  Effect of Legislation Regulating the Use of Pre-dispute Mandatory Arbitration 
Clauses
 If legislation regulating pre-dispute mandatory arbitration is to be considered, 
what should the goals be? what form would the scheme take? and how would it be 
implemented? Because the consequences of regulation are hard to anticipate and 
fully evaluate without the benefit of experience, I urge caution and restraint.
 we have seen that pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses can appear in a 
variety of agreements. This suggests that any scheme, presumably designed to 
regulate without making a distinction for the arena in which the clause appears, is 
likely to prove difficult to implement to assure fair, just, and consistent results. 
Indeed, any regulatory format that lacks f lexibility might do more harm than good. 
 Consider the different types of agreements in the targeted group: a mandatory 
arbitration clause provides different benefits in the unique context of each agreement. 
For instance, the benefit of confidentiality doesn’t have universal application. In 
matters involving credit, public disclosure of the details of the debt is of little concern 
and does no harm. However, disclosure of details about a dispute involving human 
resources can have a chilling and potentially devastating effect. The same can be 
seen with any rule that would deny the benefit of having disputes resolved using a 
nationally uniform set of procedures and decisions based on commercial norms. 
These concerns are unlikely to be significant in a collection matter where debtor 
defaults are common, but it might be otherwise in disputes involving franchise 
contracts. The franchise structure assumes the possibility of franchisees located in 
multiple locations, perhaps even across state lines. reliance on a uniform standard 
for the processing and resolution of a claim assures that all franchisees will be treated 
the same, no matter where located—a benefit that favors both the franchisor and the 
franchisee. The “ jackhammer” approach advocated by some would undermine 
attempts to treat all parties in a franchise enterprise in an even-handed, fair, and 
uniform manner.
 a regulatory scheme implies a need for some mechanism to control unacceptable 
behavior. what agency should be responsible for this function? Is there room for 
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regulation at both the federal and state levels of government? would the scheme 
replace existing schemes such as FINra? what impact would such a scheme have 
on the current trend favoring federal preemption in many matters involving 
arbitration?133
 Two differing approaches have been suggested for the regulation of arbitration 
agreements. The first is a self-executing ban on the enforcement of most pre-dispute 
mandatory arbitration clauses accompanied by a lengthy list of sanctioned exceptions. 
The second proposal addresses the applicability of arbitration to disputes involving 
rights created by specific statutes and that are monitored by a governmental agency.
 Paul Carrington proposes a self-executing system that would ban enforcement of 
any contract provision designed to preclude the application of federal or state laws 
enacted to protect an employee, “local” franchisee, or consumer.134 also unenforceable 
would be provisions drafted to deny an employee, local franchisee, or consumer 
access to state courts otherwise available to enforce state or federal laws enacted to 
protect the affected party. However, an exception would be provided that such a 
provision would still be enforceable if it allows for:
(a)  application of an otherwise valid choice of law, forum selection, 
or arbitration clause to proceedings brought to enforce rights 
created by the contract in which the clause appears;
(b) Enforcement of an arbitration agreement between an investor 
and an investment broker pursuant to regulation by a Self-
regulating organization as authorized by Section 78(s) of Title 
15;
(c)  Enforcement of an arbitration agreement made with respect to a 
dispute existing between the parties at the time the agreement is 
made;
(d) Enforcement of an otherwise valid arbitration agreement if:
 (i) The place of arbitration is located in the state;
 (ii)  The employee, local franchisee, or consumer is required to 
pay no fees in excess of those required by courts in the state;
 (iii)  The arbitral tribunal is required by contract to enforce 
statutory rights; and
133. See, e.g., Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978, 981 (2008) (“we hold today that, when parties agree to 
arbitrate all questions arising under a contract, state laws lodging primary jurisdiction in another forum, 
whether judicial or administrative, are superseded by the Faa.”).
134. Paul D. Carrington, Regulating Dispute Resolution Provisions in Adhesion Contracts, 35 Harv. J. on 
legis. 225 (1998). a local franchisee is defined as “a person engaged in retailing goods or services at not 
more than three locations in a single county or parish of a state who is authorized by contract to use the 
trade name or trademark of a franchisor engaged in commerce.” Id. at 231.
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 (iv)  The arbitral award is subject to judicial review by courts in the 
state to assure that there are no errors of law or clear errors of 
fact resulting in non-enforcement of state or federal laws 
enacted to protect employees, franchisees, or consumers.135
 a second approach, proposed by amy Schmitz, would provide for agency 
regulation within the rubric of an enacted federal program.136 Schmitz proposes such 
a program in the context of arbitration agreements addressing consumer warranty 
claims arising out of the Magnuson-Moss warranty Federal Trade Commission 
Improvements act.137 The Magnuson-Moss act was passed to enhance notice and 
disclosure of consumer warranties and to improve consumer access to remedies for 
breach of warranty claims. The act grants authority to the Federal Trade Commission 
to monitor and prescribe “minimum requirements for any informal dispute settlement 
procedure which is incorporated into the terms of a written warranty” covered by the 
act.138 Schmitz would build on existing FTC rules and regulations to include new 
rules to insure that arbitration clauses appropriately provide for:
•	 Notice;
•	 Neutrality;
•	 Reasonable	costs;
•	 Adequate	discovery	and	the	presentation	of	claims;
•	 	Fair	use	of	telephonic	or	online	dispute	resolution	with	retained	
right to in-person hearings at reasonable locations;
•	 Preservation	of	remedies;
•	 Class	relief,	consolidation,	or	joinder;
•	 Timely	decisions	and	compliance	with	awards;
•	 Public	disclosure	of	awards;	and
•	 Access	to	small	claims	court.
 The Carrington approach suffers from inf lexibility. once a list of sanctioned 
exceptions is written into a statute for political reasons, it becomes very difficult, if 
not impossible, to amend the list to include new items or to remove old ones. This, in 
135. Id. at 232.
136. See amy J. Schmitz, Curing Consumer Warranty Woes Through Regulated Arbitration, 23 ohio St. J. on 
Disp. resol. 627 (2008), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=1270827.
137. Id.; 15 u.S.C. §§ 2301–2312 (2006).
138. 15 u.S.C. § 2310(a)(2) (2006).
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turn, is an invitation for litigation trying to discern congressional intentions 
concerning the specific inclusion or exclusion of any items not included on the list. 
The Schmitz approach makes better sense because it is possible to create regulations 
that contain f lexibility, and there would be fewer obstacles to overcome to implement 
changes or modifications. 
 Still open is the following question: Is this the time for Congress to reform 
arbitration? let’s revisit and evaluate the four pre-conditions I argue need supra to be 
met before Congress adopts any legislation that would amend the Faa and change 
the face of arbitration as we know it.
 Given the depth of the empirical studies to date, I maintain that none of the four 
pre-conditions have been met and that there is no need for reform:
•	 	Mandatory	 arbitration	 clearly	 serves	 a	 number	 of	 practical	
purposes. For example, as discussed in Part II supra, arbitration 
plays a significant role in the containment of the pernicious 
effects of asymmetrically-held information;
•	 	Mandatory	arbitration	has	a	practical	economic	justification,	i.e.	
it levels the playing field where one party engaged in a commercial 
relationship unexpectedly turns predatory;
•	 	There	is	nothing	per	se	unconscionable	(or	unreasonable	for	that	
matter) about a commercial player’s insistence that there is one or 
more specific practical reasons for reliance on mandatory 
arbitration as a technique for dispute resolution;
•	 	If	mandatory	 arbitration	 is	 justified	by	 the	practical	 realities	 of	
the market place and not per se unconscionable (or unreasonable 
for that matter). There is no direct harm to any party upon whom 
it is imposed because:
	 •	 	Arbitration	is	a	recognized	technique	sanctioned	by	Congress	
and the courts;139
	 •	 	All	parties	to	an	arbitration	proceeding	are	protected	by	the	
vacatur provisions of the Faa;140
	 •	 	The	 major	 providers	 of	 arbitration	 services	 have	 adopted	
protocols designed to insure procedural fairness and due 
process in disputes that these providers administer.
139. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 u.S. 1, 24–25 (1983); cases cited supra 
note 6.
140. 9 u.S.C. §§ 10–11 (2006).
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 Given the realities of the existing system, it would thus appear that there is no 
need at this time for the system of arbitration as we know it to be reformed—a 
conclusion that is consistent with the empirical evidence reported to date.
V. CONCLUSION
 arbitration as we know it has become an accepted feature of commerce. while 
not a complete, and by no means perfect system, it serves many practical and useful 
purposes. The f laws complained of by those in opposition are a function of attempts 
at application in environments for which arbitration wasn’t designed. For example, 
arbitration was originally seen as a tool for the resolution of only factual issues. Today 
it is used in disputes involving issues of fact and law, and yet the commercial rules of 
the aaa allow an arbitrator to “grant any remedy or relief that the arbitrator deems 
just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement of the parties.”141 In other 
words, while the uses have evolved over time, the rules of the process have in many 
instances remained static. This suggests that it may well be time to revisit federal and 
state enabling statutes with a view toward determining whether regulating the most 
offensive aspects of arbitration is in order. But an outright ban on the use of mandatory 
pre-dispute arbitration clauses, or arbitration in general, is unquestionably 
inappropriate. Even regulation may not be justified absent clear and convincing 
empirical proof that arbitration as we know it today is “unfair” as an alternate dispute 
mechanism. In the final analysis, it may well turn out that arbitration in all forms is 
justified and acceptable if for no other reason than the alternative—costly and 
unpredictable litigation—is far worse.
141. Commercial arbitration r. & Mediation P. 43(a); See also CPr r. For Non-administered 
arbitration 10.3 (“The Tribunal shall apply the substantive law(s) or rules of law designated by the 
parties as applicable to the dispute. Failing such a designation by the parties, the Tribunal shall apply 
such law(s) or rules of law at it determines to be appropriate.”); JaMS Comprehensive arbitration 
r. & P. 24(c); NaF Code of P. 20(D).
